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Private Standards Organizations and Public Law
Peter L. Strauss*
Legal information institutes of the world, meeting in Montreal, declare that:
•

•
•

Public legal information from all countries and international institutions is part of
the common heritage of humanity. Maximising access to this information promotes
justice and the rule of law;
Public legal information is digital common property and should be accessible to all
on a non-profit basis and free of charge;
Organisations such as legal information institutes have the right to publish public
legal information and the government bodies that create or control that information
should provide access to it so that it can be published by other parties. ...**

"We hear of tyrants, and those cruel ones: but, whatever we may have felt, we have never
heard of any tyrant in such sort cruel, as to punish men for disobedience to laws or orders
which he had kept them from the knowledge of." ***

Abstract
Simplified, universal access to law is one of the important transformations worked by the digital
age. With the replacement of physical by digital copies, citizens ordinarily need travel only to the
*

Betts Professor of Law Columbia Law School. Thanks are due to many others, including: the participants in the
comparative administrative law symposium in Luxembourg, June 5-6, 2012; Joe Bhatia and Scott Cooper of the
American National Standards Association; Rae McQuade of the North American Energy Standards Board; Carl Malamud
of Public Resource.Org; Emily Bremer of the Administrative Conference of the United States; Professor Bruce
Ackerman; and my colleagues Jane Ginsberg, David Pozen, William Simon, and Timothy Wu. Jared Miller, ‘14,
provided indispensable research assistance. Errors, of course, are my own. Readers should be aware that, although
attempting a balanced account here, I am an interested party, having filed the petition for rulemaking discussed at some
length within, and which lies behind the body of commentary to the National Archives and Records Administration
[NARA] and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs [OIRA] often called in following footnotes. These are
FDMS dockets NARA-2012-0002 and OMB-2012-0003, which may be found on Regulations.gov. (Note that
subsequent footnotes omit the location of the FDMS dockets, and take the form FDMS Docket XXXX-2012-YYYY
or, for specific documents in the docket, FDMS Docket XXXX-2012-YYYY-ZZZZ.) I am an active member of the
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice section of the American Bar Association; while my efforts contributed to
its interest in the matter, I did not significantly contribute to its comments filed in these dockets.
**
Montreal Declaration on Free Access to Law (2002), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/info/mtldeclaration.html (visited August 29, 2012) .
***

5 Bentham, Works 547 (1843); Erwin N. Griswold used this as the epigram to his Government in Ignorance of
the Law--A Plea for Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1934).
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nearest computer to find and read the texts that bind them. Lagging behind this development,
however, has been computer access to standards developed by private standards development
organizations, often under the umbrella of the American National Standards Institute, and then
converted by agency actions incorporating them by reference into legal obligations. To discover
what colors OSHA requires for use in workplace caution signs, one must purchase from ANSI the
standard OSHA has referenced in its regulations, at the price ANSI chooses to charge for it.
The regulations governing incorporation by reference as a federal matter have not been revised
since 1982, and so do not address the changes the digital age has brought about in what it means for
incorporated matter to be “reasonably available,” as 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1) requires. This essay seeks
to bridge that gap, suggesting a variety of approaches that might bring the use of incorporation by
reference into conformity with modern rulemaking practices and respect the general proposition that
documents stating citizens’ legal obligations are not subject to copyright, while at the same time
both honoring clear federal statutory policy favoring the use of privately developed standards in
rulemaking and respecting the needs standards organizations have to find reasonable means to
support the costs of their operations. Business models created in the age of print need to change; the
challenge is to find ways to permit the market in privately developed voluntary standards to thrive,
without thereby permitting the monopoly pricing of access to governing law.

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Voluntary Consensus Standards

This essay addresses the public/private confusions over standards development organizations'
work. SDOs are private non-governmental bodies that have long existed to create voluntary private
standards by which to declare or measure the characteristics of goods on the marketplace. Throughout the world, manufacturing and markets are greatly aided, and consumers offered protection, by
the application of uniform industrial standards created independent of law, as means of assuring
quality, compatibility, and other highly desired market characteristics. They define what is meant
by U.S. Hard Red Spring Wheat,1 reflect railroads’ agreement on track widths permitting

1

Now defined by the Department of Agriculture, http://www.gipsa.usda.gov/fgis/standards/810wheat.pdf (visited
Nov. 25, 2012.
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interchangeability, establish threading conventions for nuts and bolts,2 or fix the characteristics of
the fittings that attach fire hoses to hydrants.3 Independent of any legal force they might have,
Underwriters Laboratories tags on electric appliances offer buyers assurance of their safety. The
thousands of “voluntary consensus standards” SDOs develop for industrial conduct are undeniably
beneficial to the operation of markets in complex goods and to public safety.

Hundreds of private SDOs exist in the United States alone. Under the umbrella of the American
National Standards Institute [hereinafter ANSI], one finds professional organizations of individual
engineers such as the American Society for Testing and Materials [AMST], corporate-membership
trade associations such as the American Petroleum Institute [API], and corporations in the business
of certifying safety such as Underwriters Laboratories [UL]. Abroad, there is a greater tendency to
coordinated national bodies, like the British Standards Institute [BSI], or international bodies such
as the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), and the International Organization for Standardization [ISO].4

2

For the British Eighth Army, fighting Rommel in north Africa, “British replacements for worn-out parts on their
American-made tanks reached the British armed forces just in time – only to be unusable due to literally incompatible
nuts and bolts. Differences in British and American threading standards – established in the 1840s and 1860s
respectively – thus forced the British commanders to abandon tanks and equipment in the North African desert!
...add[ing] some £25 million to the cost of war.” Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS – THE
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 130 (2011)
3

The great Baltimore fire of 1904 became the worse when fire companies called in from Washington, D.C.,
Philadelphia and other cities found they could not attach their hoses to the city’s hydrants. Tyler Wolf, Existing in a
Legal Limbo: The Precarious Legal Position of Standards Development Organizations, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 807,
808 (2008),
4

Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli offer a comprehensive and engaging view of global standards and their impact in
The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy, (Princeton 2011)
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This essay is particularly concerned with American SDOs, primarily ANSI and the SDOs it has
accredited for the generation of “voluntary consensus standards.” Not all standards fit the description “voluntary consensus standards”; some (for example, the standards for Blue-Ray computer
disks) may simply be created by a manufacturer hopeful of capturing a certain market; others may
be the product of organizations addressing compatibility issues in rapidly developing technologies
without seeking to engage wide participation in their work. As the name may suggest, “voluntary
consensus standards” are developed using procedures whose breadth of reach and interactive
characteristics resemble governmental rulemaking, with adoption requiring an elaborate process of
development, reaching a monitored consensus among those responsible within the SDO. ANSI’s
“Essential Requirements: Due process requirements for American National Standards”5 provide in
26 detailed pages a set of procedures both for accreditation and audit of SDOs wishing to develop
American National Standards and for the consideration of individual standards. Standards, once
adopted, are copyrighted as the intellectual property of the developing SDO, and offered for sale
through ANSI, SDO websites, or third-party publishers. While SDOs are generally non-profit
organizations and rely heavily on the voluntary work of engineers or others versed in the technical
issues involved, fulfilling the required procedures imposes administrative costs that must somehow
be financed.6 For the professional societies, if not for the trade associations or corporate developers
5

See
ANSI’s
“Essential
R e q uirements”
for
standards
generation,
at
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2012%20ANSI%20Essential%20Requirements%20and%20other%20Updated
%20Procedures/2012_ANSI_Essential_Requirements.pdf (Visited November 20, 2012).
6

“Not-for-profit” indicates an accepted public-serving purpose, freedom from taxation, and the absence of
shareholders (owners) who might be paid dividends out of a surplus resulting from an excess of revenue over
expenditures. Expenditures, however, may include compensation packages that, for high-ranking executives as for
university football coaches, can reach seven figures. See, e.g., FDMS Docket NARA-12-0002-0082, at 4 (Comment
from Carl Malamud, President, Public.Resource.Org) ( listing table of salaries for executives at leading SDOs, ranging
(continued...)
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of standards, these costs are substantially financed through membership dues paid to participate in
their processes and through the sale of their copyrighted standards.7
Although anti-competitive uses of standards are not unknown, and success in establishing one’s
preferences as an international standard, especially, may have significant financial consequences for
participants in international markets – favoring some and imposing additional costs on others8 –
standards are, on the whole, both necessary and beneficial. Complex markets could not operate
without them. The processes ANSI and other organizations have developed to assure consensus and
provide safeguards against their abuse seem generally effective and, within the industrial community
as a whole there is every motivation to support them. This paper takes no issue with their development and use as voluntary consensus standards and accepts that, at least where standards may
compete with one another,9 market forces may work to control owners’ exploitation of copyrights
in them.

B. Their Occasional Conversion Into Legal Obligations

Increasingly, American governments – federal, state, and local – have been adopting part or all

6

(...continued)
from $420,960 to $2,075,984) . The possibility that the prices set by SDOs are self-serving, then, cannot be excluded.
7

See, e.g. National Fire Protection Association, “Content Strategy” (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.nfpa.org/itemdetail.asp?categoryid=2436&itemid=55491&url=about%20nfpa/content%20strategy (Visited December 25, 2012).
Remarking in one breath “We have had great success over the years using a business model in which the principal source
of revenue was the sale of print editions of our codes and standards,” the document next observes “That business model
is no longer sustainable.” This is the reality with which this paper is concerned.
8

Büthe and Mattli, n. 4 above, present this as the organizing theme of their important work.

9

Ibid.
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of some of these standards (e.g., what standardized colors should be used for caution signs in a
work-place) as regulatory requirements. Incorporation by reference at the state and local level both
greatly eases the work of governments and arms markets. If the Southern Building Code Congress
International and its competitors10 had not drawn up model building codes, each small town would
have been obliged to develop its own, at high cost and low efficiency; as a result, builders and
manufacturers of building materials might have found their markets extraordinarily complex. With
a model code in place, builders will know that materials meeting its standards are acceptable for
construction, and material suppliers will learn what qualities in their goods will likely satisfy the
market as a whole.11 (What benefits the village of Hastings on Hudson may also benefit the maker
and users of nuclear power plant equipment having the benefit of standards developed by the
American Nuclear Society – as well, it may be hoped, as neighbors to the plant wishing assurance
of its safety.) For a commercial builder, too, the cost of acquiring copies of the relevant adopted
codes is likely trivial in relation to its other expenses; but for the homeowner who wishes himself
to make code-compliant alterations in his own home, this may not be true, and in that possibility lies
much of the impulse for this paper.

At the federal level, the conversion of standards into legal obligations through incorporation by
reference had its origin primarily in a wish to protect the utility of the Federal Register and the Code
of Federal Regulations, reducing their otherwise necessary size by thousands of printed pages, and
10

Building Officials Code Administrators International [BOCA], International Conference of Building Officials
[ICBO], International Code Council [ICC], National Fire Protection Association [NFPA]
11

Delaware’s State Fire Prevention Commission, for example, recently adopted the National Electrical
Manufacturers’ Association’s National Electric Code of 2011, with two amendments, as minimum standards binding on
all local jurisdictions in the state. http://www.nema.org/Technical/Code-Alerts/Pages/05-December---Delaware.aspx.
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secondarily in the hope of giving a kick-start to new federal safety programs, by converting to legal
obligations consensus standards already in place. The American Administrative Procedure Act has
long required the publication of legally binding agency regulations in both the federal daily journal
of record, the Federal Register, and the compendium of regulations, the Code of Federal Regulations
[CFR]. No one would claim that the material thus published is subject to copyright; but when
industry standards are incorporated by reference, they are merely identified by name and source.
Their contents are not published – that is, indeed, the point in protecting the volume of the Federal
Register and the CFR – and to know those contents one must ordinarily purchase them from their
copyright owner. Section 552(a)(1) of the APA states a procedure for incorporation by reference,
that offers no direct guidance on the question whether an SDO standard incorporated not as a
possible technical means for compliance, but as law, remains in the copyright control of its creator:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register
for the guidance of the public— ...
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and
adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof,
a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by,
a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published. For
the purpose of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of persons
affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register when incorporated by
reference therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register. [Emphases added.]
The Director has implemented this provision by regulations discussed within, that at present do not
define what it means for matter to be “reasonably available” beyond requiring single copies to be
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deposited with the National Archives and retained in agency libraries.12

More recent measures, and the realities of shrinking federal regulatory resources, have both
encouraged the practice of incorporation, and created a federal framework for participation and
oversight. The Reagan administration, noted generally for its deregulatory emphasis, formulated
an OMB Circular, A-119, strongly encouraging a preference for privately generated standards over
agency-generated standards where the former were available.13 In 1988, the transformation of the
National Bureau of Standards – the guardian of national standards for weights, measures, and the
like – into the Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
provided a bureaucracy to implement this preference.14 During President Clinton’s administration,
passage of the National Technology Transfer Advancement Act of 199515 [NTTAA] gave Circular
A-119 statutory force by requiring federal agencies to “use technical standards that are developed
or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to
carry out policy objectives or activities,” absent a specific finding of their inadequacy.16 Although
“technical standards” are defined in a way that focuses on interoperability17 and appears to suppose

12

See n. 80 within.

13

See H.R. Rep. No. 104-390 at 25 (1995) (recounting history of Circular A-119).

14

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5111-5115, 102 Stat. 1107, 1427-

1433.
15

P.L. 104-113 (1996). Available at http://standards.gov/nttaa.cfm.

16

Sec. 12(d)(1).

17

Id., s
ubsection (4) defines “technical standards” as “performance-based or design-specific technical specifications and related
management systems practices.”
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the existence of independently stated regulatory requirements and consequent likely diminished
interest outside regulated communities, even before the NTTAA it was estimated that 10% or more
of ANSI standards related to the health and safety of industrial products and processes.18 The most
recent revisions to Circular A-119, in 1998, instruct agencies to take steps to assure openness,
balance, transparency, consensus and due process in the procedures SDOs use to develop qualifying
standards,19 and, like the NTTAA itself,20 provide support for federal agency participation in those
activities.21 The result is to give further impetus to the ANSI “Essential Requirements.”22

18

Ross E. Cheit, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 22 (1990) (900
out of 8,500 ANSI standards then existing considered to relate to health and safety).
19

“4. What Are Voluntary, Consensus Standards?
a. For purposes of this policy, "voluntary consensus standards" are standards developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies, both domestic and international. These standards include provisions requiring that owners
of relevant intellectual property have agreed to make that intellectual property available on a non-discriminatory,
royalty-free or reasonable royalty basis to all interested parties. For purposes of this Circular, "technical standards that
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standard bodies" is an equivalent term.
(1) "Voluntary consensus standards bodies" are domestic or international organizations which plan, develop, establish,
or coordinate voluntary consensus standards using agreed-upon procedures. For purposes of this Circular, "voluntary,
private sector, consensus standards bodies," as cited in Act, is an equivalent term. The Act and the Circular encourage
the participation of federal representatives in these bodies to increase the likelihood that the standards they develop will
meet both public and private sector needs. A voluntary consensus standards body is defined by the following attributes:
(i) Openness.
(ii) Balance of interest.
(iii) Due process.
(vi) An appeals process.
(v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity, and includes a process for
attempting to resolve objections by interested parties, as long as all comments have been fairly considered, each objector
is advised of the disposition of his or her objection(s) and the reasons why, and the consensus body members are given
an opportunity to change their votes after reviewing the comments. ...”
20

NTTAA §12(d)(2).

21

“7. What Is The Policy For Federal Participation In Voluntary Consensus Standards Bodies?
Agencies must consult with voluntary consensus standards bodies, both domestic and international, and must
participate with such bodies in the development of voluntary consensus standards when consultation and participation
is in the public interest and is compatible with their missions, authorities, priorities, and budget resources. ...”
22

N. 5 above.
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Although Circular A-119 states its application only to “technical standards,” contemporary
reports of the use of standards afford no ready means of determining what proportion of them
effectively do impose regulatory requirements, and the Office of the Federal Register, in administering Section 552(a)(1), pays that question no heed. The use of standards in lieu of independent
federal rulemaking is indeed widespread. In its most recent report, for Fiscal 2009,23 NIST found
that only one agency, the Department of Labor, had reported adopting a government-unique rather
than an SDO standard in the preceding year (and that one incorporated 9 SDO standards into a
single rule); in contrast, NIST reported the adoption of 363 new SDO standards, many as substitutes
for existing, government-unique standards. Nor have agencies been standing by as standards are
being developed. In Fiscal 2009, NIST reported, agency personnel participated in 528 SDOs. At
this writing, a “Standards Incorporated by Reference” database maintained by NIST24 lists 9486
standards referred to in the Code of Federal Regulations, and 362 organizations (largely but not
exclusively SDOs25) whose standards are referred to– ranging from 2229 times for the American
Society for Testing and Materials to 113 whose standards are referred to only once.

It is important to be aware that most of the standards referred to in the CFR and converted into
legal obligations no longer reflect prevailing voluntary consensus standards. ANSI generally
requires that standards it certifies be revisited at least every five years, and their modification
through its voluntary consensus process is common. But OFR is firmly of the view, understandable
23
Mary F. Donaldson, Thirteenth Annual Report on Federal Agency Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and
Conformity Assessment (NISTIR 7718).
24

25

http://standards.gov/sibr/query/index.cfm?fuseaction=rsibr.total_regulatory_sibr
Government bodies are included.
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in the context of American rulemaking law, that once a standard has been incorporated by reference
in agency rulemaking, it can be changed only by fresh rulemaking; and OFR permits incorporation
only of particular, precisely identified and existing standards, so that a rule cannot validly incorporate future revisions. Although rulemaking changes would inevitably lag a bit behind the voluntary
consensus process, the costs of rulemaking and limitations on agency resources have resulted in
incorporated standards being left in place as legal obligations long after they have been abandoned
by their creators as voluntary standards. Thus, the majority of standards incorporated into federal
regulations were incorporated before 1996 – some, even decades before.26 Comments in the FDMS
dockets of two recent inquiries into incorporation by reference issues identify numerous incorporated standards, still law, that are unavailable27 or have subsequently been revealed to be inadequate
or even dangerous.28

SDOs’ copyright claims on standards do not lapse with their abandonment as voluntary consensus standards, so if a standard has been incorporated by reference its ostensible copyright endures
for the life of the rule incorporating it. Circular A-119 specifically calls on agencies to respect SDO
copyrights29 and, indeed, the behavior of American governments in relation to incorporated standards has generally worked to preserve those claims. Rather than publishing the standards’ texts in
their regulations, they simply refer the readers of their regulations to the standards which they have

26

See text at n. 127 within.

27

Ibid.

28

See n. 125 within.

29

Sec. 6(j), 63 F.R. 8546, 8555 (Feb. 19, 1998).
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“incorporated by reference.” Under a regime that requires only two print copies to be kept in
government depositories in Washington D.C. or its near suburbs, and makes no current provision
for internet access,30 the only practical course for someone in Minnesota, California, or Alabama
who is affected by and wishes to learn the resulting law will usually be to purchase the standard
from the SDO whose intellectual property it is, at whatever price that organization chooses to set.

C. And Hence the Problem to Be Discussed

These facts frame the basic concern of this essay, raising a question that to lawyers might appear
simply rhetorical: If standards have been made into law, don't they have to be public? Don’t
American citizens and companies have a right to read laws governing their conduct without having
to pay the monopoly price a valid copyright would permit a private organization “owning” that legal
obligation to charge for permitting access to it, on such terms as it chose to require? As the United
States Copyright Office well knows,31 “law is not subject to copyright.” The Information Age now
makes it trivial to provide access that may have been more difficult in the age of print, and federal
agencies in particular have for almost two decades been under a statutory duty to make all regulations and other matter affecting private conduct available in the electronic reading rooms they are

30

See n. 80 within.

31
U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices §206.01: “Edicts of government, such as
judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents
are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy.” And see Goldstein on Copyright §2.5.2, at 2:51: “it is difficult to
imagine an area of creative endeavor in which the copyright incentive is needed less [than for standards generation].”
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obliged to maintain.32 All materials placed there are freely available to anyone with access to the
Internet.

Yet the question is not rhetorical. If we were to impair the SDOs’ markets for their standards,
how would they support their undeniably beneficial work? With good reason, moreover, many
SDOs will assert that those directly governed by a particular standard should find the cost of
obtaining it comparable to a law school casebook’s cost and – similarly – both trivial in relation to
their other costs and beneficial to them in avoiding the otherwise substantial cost of personally
obtaining the same information. These assertions, however, overlook two important countervailing
considerations: the interests many who are not affected businesses may have in knowing what the
standards are,33 and the way in which conversion of a voluntary standard into a legal requirement
can distort the market for that standard.

The first of these considerations may be illustrated by the recent request of a House of Representatives committee to obtain for its review a standard governing required public warnings about pipeline safety that the API had developed, and that the federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration [PHMSA] had incorporated by reference into its regulations. API asked the
committee to pay it $1195 for the privilege. In PHMSA’s required notice of proposed rulemaking,
the Federal Register had provided to its readers only the identity of the API standard it was propos-

32
Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 4, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049
(codified at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2) (2006)); see also E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 207(f)(1), 116 Stat.
2899, 2918.
33

Docket NARA-2012-0002-0117 (Public Agency Safety Management Ass’n).
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ing to make a legal obligation – neither its text nor any supporting data or reasoning.34 Once the
standard had been incorporated into the PHMSA’s regulations, all the CFR told readers was that
they must obey the identified API standard, which they could either inspect at the National Archives
or the agency, or purchase from API. In addition to the House committee, many persons not “in the
business” could have a significant interest in knowing the content of a standard that was important,
and perhaps inadequate, to assuring public safety. For them, a “trivial cost of doing business”
argument is unconvincing.35

The “trivial cost of doing business” argument is also challenged by settings that may require the
purchase of numerous standards. Purchasing Underwriters Laboratories’ 52-page Standard UL38,
“Standard for Manual Signaling Boxes for Fire Alarm Systems,” incorporated by reference in many
municipal codes, costs $502 for a hard copy ($998 if one also wishes a three-year subscription to its
future revisions, interpretations, etc.). If one were also to purchase all the other UL standards
referred to in those 52 pages as elements of the standard – five of which are referred to secondarily,
and an additional 27 of which are referred to in one of those secondary standards – the total cost

34

FDMS docket OMB-2012-0003-0008, p. 14 (comments of Carl Malamud for Public Resource, also available as
FDMS docket NARA-2012-0002-0109). Although API eventually retracted this demand, it catalyzed the passage of
Section 24 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act of 2011, Public Law 112-90, which
provides that in the future “the Secretary [of Transportation] may not issue guidance or a regulation [concerning pipeline
safety] that incorporates by reference any documents or portions thereof unless the documents or portions thereof are
made available to the public, free of charge, on an Internet Web site.” PHMSA’s and industry’s distress over this statute
occasioned a July 13, 2012 conference on the issues; until summer 2013 its files are online at http://phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site/PHMSA/menuitem.ebdc7a8a7e39f2e55cf2031050248a0c/?vgnextoid=3c76b62089ce7310VgnVCM1000001
ecb7898RCRD&vgnextchannel=d248724dd7d6c010VgnVCM10000080e8a8c0RCRD&vgnextfmt=print (visited August
8, 2012).
35

Nor is it convincing for small businesses when these costs are considered in the aggregate. Even if the cost af
particular standards is slight, the cumulative costs of the standards they must be aware of can be quite forbidding. See
note 39 below.
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would exceed $10,000.36

As for market distortion and monopoly pricing, consider the electronic bookshop of the American Herbal Products Association. AHPA publishes “Herbs of Commerce,” a book setting standards
“by which all plant common and scientific names will be determined on all products containing
herbs.” After AHPA published the first edition of this book in 1992, the Food and Drug Administration incorporated it by reference as one element of its regulation specifying the required nomenclature for the ingredients of dietary supplements.37 AHPA offers this edition on its website for
$250, on condition that it is “Available only in PDF format ... [and] may not be printed, transferred
or sold.”38 In 2000, it published a second edition considering 2048 different items, which its website
understandably characterizes as “a must-have for anyone who writes about or manufactures herbal
products.” One would think this more modern edition commercially more valuable, but the FDA
has not yet incorporated its terms into law by reference. AHPA offers this edition for $99.99,
without stated use restrictions. Thus, it charges $150 more for an out-of-date standard that nonethe-

36

UL sells its standards on http://www.comm-2000.com, which may be searched for UL38. http://www.comm-2000.com/productdetails.aspx?sendingPageType=BigBrowser&CatalogID=Standards&ProductID=UL38_8_S_2008
0704%28ULStandards2%29 (visited November 24, 2012). Standard 746C, Standard for Polymeric Materials - Use in
Electrical Equipment Evaluations, one of the five standards referenced in Standard 38, in turn references 27 unique other
UL standards, whose individual prices are often hundreds of dollars higher
37

21 C.F.R. 101.4(h): “The common or usual name of ingredients of dietary supplements that are botanicals
(including fungi and algae) shall be consistent with the names standardized in Herbs of Commerce, 1992 edition, which
is incorporated by reference in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from the
American Herbal Products Association, 8484 Georgia Ave., suite 370, Silver Spring, MD 20910, 301-588-1171 , FAX
301-588-1174, e-mail: ahpa@ahpa.org, or may be examined at the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition's
Library, 5100 Paint Branch Pkwy., College Park, MD 20740, or at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA).” That two physical copies may be available for inspection in the Washington D.C. or its near suburb seems
unlikely to mean much to a herbalist in Minnesota, California, or Alabama.
38

http://www.ahpa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=347 (Visited August 8, 2012)
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less is law, than for its “must-have for anyone who writes about or manufactures herbal products.”
This is monopoly pricing of law, not copyright pricing to the market for voluntary consensus
standards. It is a price utterly dependent on the fact that the outdated first edition is still law that
FDA can enforce and manufacturers are therefore obligated to obey.

The API and AHPA are trade associations; UL is a not-for-profit corporation in the business of
certifying the safety of electrical goods, whose standards state the conditions a good must satisfy to
earn the UL certified label. Professional societies like the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) seem, in general, to charge those who purchase their standards lower prices,
even though these societies are more dependent on the resulting revenues to support their standardgenerating work. Yet the number of standards that a small business must know and comply with
may still make purchase a substantial economic burden.39 Although OMB’s Memorandum A-119
characterizes voluntary consensus standards as characterized by “provisions requiring that owners
of relevant intellectual property have agreed to make that intellectual property available on a
non-discriminatory, royalty-free or reasonable royalty basis to all interested parties,” no mechanism
exists for registration or oversight of royalty reasonableness – indeed for monitoring any aspect of

39

FDMS docket NARA-12-0002-0147, at 1-2 (Letter from Jerry Call, Executive Vice President, Am. Foundry Soc.)
(“$75 is not much for a standard, but a typical small manufacturer, including a foundry, may be subject to as many as
1000 standards. The ASTM foundry safety standard alone cross-references 35 other consensus standards and that is just
the tip of the iceberg ...”). Accord, NARA-12-0002-0152 (Letter from David J. Osiecki, Senior Vice President, Policy
& Regulatory Affairs,Am. Trucking Ass’n), NARA-12-0002-0153 (Letter from Jess McCluer, Director of Safety and
Regulatory Affairs, Nat’l Grain & Feed Ass’n), NARA-12-0002-0156 (Comments of Owner-Operator Independent
Drivers Ass’n, Inc.). The burden is that much greater when one considers the desirability of purchase at the proposal
stage, see NARA-12-0002-0145, at 2 (Letter from John L. Conley, President, Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers) (“One of the
most challenging aspects . . . was that as published in the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, any party wishing
to comment on the petition would first have to purchase the publications in order to determine what changes would be
made to existing regulations and to determine the impact of the proposal.”), or the arguable need to purchase not only
the standard that has been incorporated, but its subsequent revisions. See Letter from Am. Foundry Soc., at 2.
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standards’ marketing once incorporation by reference has occurred. Even at the outset, no law or
regulation controls the prices that may be asked, or distinguishes among the types of SDO generating a standard that happens to have been adopted into law.

The paragraphs that follow take up a series of interrelated issues and suggestions: the uncertain
state of the caselaw on the copyrightability of standards that have been converted into law; the
existing federal regime for regulation incorporation by reference and suggestions for its modernization; techniques for preserving the viability of copyright; and techniques for avoiding monopoly
pricing of standards converted into law.

II. THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF THE CASELAW ON THE COPYRIGHTABILITY
OF STANDARDS THAT HAVE BEEN CONVERTED INTO LAW

No doubt attends the copyrightability of voluntary consensus standards as such. But when they
cease to be voluntary, when all or part of a standard has been converted into legal obligation, do the
words that are now law remain under copyright? One issue here is the copyrightability of law; a
secondary issue would be whether, if enactment of elements of a standard as law converts them, in
effect, into public property, that is a taking requiring just compensation.

The U.S. Copyright Office states forthrightly that “[e]dicts of government, such as judicial
opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal
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documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy.”40 The proposition that public law is
not subject to copyright first emerged in American law (before the age of statutes or the Internet) in
conflicts over the reporting of judicial opinions. “[T]he court are unanimously of opinion, that no
reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that the
judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”41 “[T]here has always been a judicial
consensus ... that no copyright could under the statutes passed by Congress, be secured in the
products of the labor done by judicial officers in the discharge of their judicial duties. The whole
work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which,
binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of unwritten law, or
an interpretation of a constitution or a statute. Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 35.”42 Nash, the cited
case, grew from the first days of national law publishing houses – Little-Brown, West Publishing,
and Lawyers’ Cooperative Publishing. Beyond its emphatic reaffirmation of “the public and
common right to examine and procure copies of the opinions of the justices,”43 it laid the groundwork for a distinction commonly observed – that although documents constituting the law itself are
not subject to copyright, still copyright protection can be obtained for compendia that include these
documents along with other elements that are not, as such, the public’s property. And thus, West’s
headnotes secure sale of its reporters (as, today, Lexis’ capacity to charge for access to its resources).

40

Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices §206.01 (1984).

41

Wheaton v. Peters, 35 U.S. 591, 668 (1834).

42

Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253-4 (1888).

43

At 39.
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In addition to the general proposition of “law ... free for publication to all,” cases arising from
the judicial opinions, rendered well before federal agency incorporation by reference of SDO
standards began, relied on the fact that judges were salaried public servants Paid by the public for
their work, judges could properly claim no property in its output. The authors of legislation and
regulatory outputs, too, have already been paid for their work. On the other hand, some argue, since
SDOs’ only compensation for intellectual output comes from some combination of membership fees
and copyright revenues, an agency’s choice to give mandatory status to their standards through
incorporation by reference does not carry the same implication.
These arguments, however, do not distinguish between the indisputably retained right to publish
one’s own intellectual work product, and the right to publish, precisely and only to that extent, such
elements of those texts as have been converted into legally binding obligations. Nor have they
distinguished between the elements of value created by a contemporary voluntary consensus
standard, as such, and the additional value that inheres in its having been converted into a legal
obligation. As in the case of “Herbs of Commerce,” the market for a standard will persist even after
the standard has been modified or displaced by its sponsoring SDO as a voluntary consensus
standard, if the governing law incorporating the earlier version of the standard has not changed. But
now the price for the standard is a price for law, plain and simple. First editions of other lawbearing works, treatises or casebooks for example, go off the new-goods market once second
editions appear; certainly (save possibly for collectibles) their value is much less. But this is not
reflected in SDO pricing of displaced voluntary standards; if they are still law, their value as law
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may even exceed the market value they had as just voluntary consensus standards.44

As Professor Lawrence Cunningham suggested in a thoughtful analysis of accounting
standards,45 it can be useful to address the copyrightability issue in terms of a typology. Some
standards may be created precisely in the expectation that they will be adopted as law – on analogy,
say, to the Uniform Commercial Code, which was drafted by private and quasi-governmental
bodies, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, directly for consideration and use by law-makers. Other copyrighted works may be
referenced in legal obligations but themselves convey no legal obligation as such – a novel listed as
a required element of English classes for public school tenth graders, or a publication placing values
on used cars that state law anoints as valid in state tort actions. In between these poles lie most
voluntary consensus standards that have been converted into legal obligations through incorporation
by reference; they may not have been created in the expectation or hope that they would be used in
this way, but their incorporation converts their terms into the very stuff of legal obligation. A
dietary supplement is lawful only if its ingredient list conforms to the nomenclature to be found in
AHPA’s incorporated first edition of “Herbs of Commerce.”

When standards are written explicitly in the contemplation of their use as law, they may
themselves be copyright; an extension of copyright protection to the form in which they are in fact

44

See text at N. 37

45

Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 Mich.L.Rev. 291

(2005),
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made law, however, would be troublesome. Private development of the Uniform Commercial Code
by the ALI and NCCUSL greatly facilitated state-by-state legislative adoptions that produced an
essentially uniform national law of commerce. The UCC itself is copyright, as are materials
reflecting the history of its drafting, and accompanying commentary. Yet when Minnesota adopted
its terms as Minnesota law – publishing the adopted text, as amended perhaps, in its statutory
collections – any claim that Minnesotans must pay ALI or NCCUSL to see the text their state had
enacted would convert the law into private property.46 If the standard has been designed to become
law, the claim of the public to know it is strong, and the SDO is more likely to be disappointed if its
work is not converted into legal obligations than surprised if it is. So too, it would seem to follow,
for the SBCCI model housing code. That code would itself be copyright, giving SBCCI the
exclusive right to sell it as such, in a compilation that might include any accompanying commentary. But if a Texas town accepted the implicit invitation to convert its terms, perhaps changed in
a few particulars, into the set of local ordinances governing home construction in its jurisdiction,
mightn’t those ordinances be published as the law of that town, without violating SBCCI’s copyright?

This was the question presented in Veeck v. SBBCI,47 a judgment of the Fifth Circuit sitting en
banc that is the strongest recent voicing of the principle that law is not subject to copyright. While
SBCCI had a valid copyright in its model code, conferring on it exclusive rights to sell that code as

46
Whether the ALI and/or NCCUSL could demand payment from Minnesota for its “taking” of their property is
a formal question, and takings issues are to some extent considered within. The very nature of their enterprise, however,
suggests its answer.
47

Veeck v. SBCCI, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)..
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such; what the Fifth Circuit held it could not prevent the publication online of what had been
adopted as the law of the jurisdiction that adopted it. “‘[T]he law,’ whether articulated in judicial
opinions or legislative acts or ordinances, is in the public domain and thus not amenable to copyright.”48 The court rejected the proposition that this idea depended on the salaries paid to public
authors of opinions, laws, and regulations. “[T]he ‘authorship’ question ignores the democratic
process. ... In performing their function [by choosing a voluntary consensus standard], the lawmakers represent the public will, and the public are the final ‘authors’ of the law.”49 Yet, the Veeck court
reasoned, SBCCI’s copyright in its model code was indisputable, and no one could print it, as such,
without a license from SBCCI. What governed the case was that Veeck had copied only “the law”
of two Texas towns. “The basic proposition was stated by [the first] Justice Harlan, writing for the
Sixth Circuit: ‘any person desiring to publish the statutes of a state may use any copy of such
statutes to be found in any printed book.’”50

The “model code” character of SBCCI’s carries with it considerations one might think particularly supportive of a denial of copyright protection for whole sets of standards that, as in Veeck, are
converted into law by some particular jurisdiction. First, code developers who seek incorporation,
like ALI and NCCUSL or the developers of model building codes, face no difficulty in preserving
the market value of their product. It may include explanatory materials, examples, and other matter
that will not be enacted; it will be presented in a format that is relatively cheap to buy and easy to

48

At 796.

49

At 799.

50

At 800, quoting Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 137 (6th Cir. 1898).
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carry about for reference. For such a document, rather than destroying a market, a requirement that
what has been enacted must be public could be expected to enhance the value of the SDO’s product,
enlarging if not in fact creating the market for it. Incorporation would also confer satisfying prestige
on the SDO (likely a substantial motivation for creation in the first place), adding to the value of its
other works. These offsetting benefits51 make it unlikely that incorporation will have diminished the
value of the SDO’s property.

Second, the motivation specifically to create a work to be given the force of law suggests that
recognizing copyright carries considerable risks of exploitation not of the intellectual merits of the
work, as such, but of the necessities created by its status as law. If it did not anticipate sufficient
reward from the satisfaction and prestige accompanying having the merits of its work thus recognized, or from the possibilities incorporation would open up of commercial exploitation of supplementary (but non-essential) instructive or explanatory materials, an SDO could require an adopting
jurisdiction to pay it up front for its efforts – that is, it could contract for the work of producing it.

Practice Management Info. Corp. v. American Medical Ass’n,52 extensively discussed in Veeck,
seems at first to be in tension with it but rather, as Veeck recognizes,53 reflects this economic reality.
The AMA had developed and copyrighted a comprehensive coding system for physicians to use in
reporting their services and medical procedures. In return for a promise to use no other system, it
51
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). And see Goldstein on Copyright §2.5.2, at 2:51: “it is difficult to
imagine an area of creative endeavor in which the copyright incentive is needed less [than for standards generation].”
52

121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).

53

293 F.3d at 804.
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granted the federal Health Care Financing Administration a “non-exclusive, royalty-free and
irrevocable” license.54 This license was free of any restrictions on the government’s right to
reproduce or distribute the codes, but reserved copyright in relation to possible private competitors.
HCFA then developed the Health Care Common Procedure Coding System [HCPCS] as a mandatory common procedure coding system for physicians’ use on Medicare and Medicaid claims; it
included both the copyrighted AMA Code and additional codes HCFA had itself developed. After
the AMA denied PMI a volume discount for purchase of its code (that is, not the HCPCS), PMI
sought a declaratory judgment that AMA’s copyright was invalid, intending to publish the AMA
code in an alternative, perhaps cheaper form than AMA itself sold.55 While the court rejected that
claim, adopting the limited “judges are paid for their work” understanding of the earlier Supreme
Court cases,56 it had no occasion to rule on PMI’s right to publish the federal standard as such – that
is, the HCPCS including its non-AMA codes. Just as Veeck could not properly have published the
SBCCI model building code as such – but was within his rights publishing the uncopyrightable
building codes of two Texas towns – PMI could not publish, as such, the copyrighted AMA coding
system.57 In the end, in fact, PMI prevailed, on the ground that in extracting HCFA’s promise to
use no other coding system, the AMA had abused its copyright.58

54

121 F. 3d at 517

55

At 518.

56

Ibid.

57

Consider, in this respect, the Delaware State Fire Prevention Commission’s recent adoption of the 2011 National
Electric Code as law for Delaware, but with two amendments it itself made, and permission granted to localities to adopt
improving (and not inconsistent) amendments. http://www.nema.org/Technical/Code-Alerts/Pages/05-December---Delaware.aspx.
58

121 F.2d at 521.
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Another case discussed and distinguished in Veeck, CCC Info. Services v. Maclean Hunter
Market Reports, Inc.,59 falls at Professor Cunningham’s other pole – both because the alleged
copyright violator had sought to republish the copyrighted work as such, and because the law’s
reference to that work had not had the effect of converting it itself into a legal obligation. A New
York statute required insurance companies to include “The Red Book” as one of several privately
prepared and copyrighted lists of projected automobile values when they were determining payments for the loss of a vehicle. CCC Information Services simply appropriated parts of The Red
Book for its customers. Unprepared “to hold that a state's reference to a copyrighted work as a legal
standard for valuation results in loss of the copyright,"60 the Second Circuit equated CCC’s claim
with the proposition that novels would lose copyright once assigned as part of a mandatory school
curriculum. “If a statute refers to the Red Book or to specific school books,” the Veeck court wrote,

the law requires citizens to consult or use a copyrighted work in the process of fulfilling
their obligations. The copyrighted works do not "become law" merely because a statute
refers to them. See 1 GOLDSTEIN COPYRIGHT, § 2.49 at n. 45.2 ( noting that CCC and
Practice Management "involved compilations of data that had received governmental
approval, not content that had been enacted into positive law"). Equally important, the
referenced works or standards in CCC and Practice Management were created by private
groups for reasons other than incorporation into law. To the extent incentives are relevant
to the existence of copyright protection, the authors in these cases deserve incentives. And
neither CCC nor AMA solicited incorporation of their standards by legislators or regulators.
In the case of a model code, on the other hand, the text of the model serves no other purpose
than to become law. SBCCI operates with the sole motive and purpose of creating codes that
will become obligatory in law.61

Neither Veeck nor cases like CCH Information Services directly control the setting in which a
59

44 F.3d 61 (2nd Cir. 1994).

60

At 74.

61

At 804-05.
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voluntary consensus standard has, through incorporation by reference, become law, itself binding
on citizens. On the one hand, it is law in the strong sense that underlies the belief that citizens are
entitled to unconstrained access to the standards that govern their conduct at the risk of possible
penalty for violation. On the other, the authors of voluntary consensus standards generated to that
end – that is, not for the “motive and purpose of creating codes that will become obligatory in law”
– deserve incentives to support their socially valuable conduct. On the one hand, the creation of a
voluntary consensus standard can be valued by a market; it may be in competition with other
standards bearing on similar issues, and the price it can command may be a function of its intrinsic
worth to its purchasers. On the other hand, if it is converted into a legal obligation, not only may the
price it can command may be artificially inflated by that fact, as in the case of the AHPA’s “Herbs
of Commerce (1st ed.),62 but the public’s stake in knowing what standard has been proposed and on
what basis, and having the chance to participate in its consideration, is greatly heightened. This is
Professor Cunningham’s difficult middle ground.

Are there means, then, to avoid undermining the financial viability of SDOs, as they fear simple
rejection of copyright in their incorporated standards would do, while facilitating citizen access to
binding legal obligations and controlling against the possibility of monopoly pricing of law? Before
turning to this ultimate question, it will be useful to set forth the current statutory and regulatory
regimes affecting incorporation by reference and proposals that have been made for altering them.

62

N. 15 above.
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III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
A. The Office of the Federal Register

As earlier shown,63 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1) specifically authorizes incorporation by reference of
materials that the Director of the Office of the Federal Register finds to be “reasonably available to
the class of persons affected thereby.” When Section 552(a) was enacted, both the Federal Register
and the Code of Federal Regulations – like the law generally – were exclusively print documents.
Permitting the incorporation by reference in them of bulky, numerous standards protected their size,
and it was primarily for that reason that incorporation by reference of material that might state
binding legal obligations was permitted. Section 552(a) requires the Director to determine for each
standard he approves for incorporation by reference, case by case, that it is “reasonably available.”
Congress would have had reason to believe that, by virtue of office, the Director would be institutionally committed to public awareness of law. And those supporting the measure acknowledged
the public’s need to know the law. Its legislative history seems to have assumed that the incorporated material would not be copyright; but that the texts of standards made law by incorporation
would be published by commercial law publishers operating in the competitive market for their
services – West, CCH, Prentiss Hall.64 The texts just would not be published in the Federal Register
or the CFR. Given these expectations, Congress’s members could have believed the law would be
widely available in law libraries open to public use. Providing for “reasonable availability” thus

63

P. 7 above.

64

Thus, S. Rep. No. 88-1219, at 4-5 (1964) anticipated ready availability in terms of material “publicized in
professional or specialized services, such as Commerce Clearing House, West publications, etc.”
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entailed neither the need personally to pay for access to the law nor, especially, the risk of monopoly
pricing.

The Office of Federal Register last adopted regulations to govern incorporation by reference in
1982, before the Information Age.65 Whatever the enacting Congress might have expected, the text
and administration of 1 CFR Part 51 reveal a remarkable indifference to actual public knowledge
of the law. Agencies need not inform OFR of their intention to incorporate a given standard as a
legal obligation until 20 working days before its submission for publication in the Federal Register
as a final rule.66 Thus, Part 51 pays no attention to the value of providing the interested public an
opportunity for comment on proposed regulations, when they are to be found in material to be
incorporated by reference. That is, Part 51 is indifferent to a standard’s public availability, reasonable or not, at the time when it is proposed to be incorporated in a regulation,. Imagine that the
PHMSA (or for that matter the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) were to propose a rule to deal with
the problem of possible corrosion in pipes, and that its proposal said only that it proposed to
incorporate by reference “A Modified Criterion for Evaluating the Remaining Strength of Corroded
Pipe,” a standard developed by the Pipeline Research Council Int’l. The PRC is “a community of
the world’s leading pipeline companies,”67 and sells this standard for $995.68 One wishing to
comment on such a proposal, a matter of considerable interest to anyone who might be affected by

65

1 CFR Part 51.

66

1 CFR 51.5(a)(1)

67

http://prci.org/index.php/about/, visited November 18, 2012.

68

http://prci.org/index.php/pm/pubs_localsearch/ and search by title (visited November 18, 2012).
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pipe failure – not only pipeline companies, as recent catastrophes have amply demonstrated69 –
would be obliged to make this purchase if she wished to understand the proposal on which she had
been invited to comment. If she were able to view the proposed standard, moreover, it is highly
uncertain she would have access to the data, studies and discussions on which it had been based.

Having to purchase access to the proposal and the likely unavailability of its supporting materials both conflict sharply with the contemporary law of rulemaking and with the Internet developments that have made access to both proposals and supporting studies costless and immediate for
all, once material is placed online.70 How can one comment persuasively on a standard whose
content and underlying basis are unknown? Judge Harold Leventhal asked that question four
decades ago,71 and judges ever since have understood rulemaking’s statutory notice requirement to
also to require agencies simultaneously to release important materials on which the proposal relies.
This understanding is at some tension, to be sure, with a statute worded in very general terms,72 but

69

Andrew Lehren, Millions of Miles of Pipe, and Years of Questions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 2010, at A1; Corrosion
in Pipe May Have Caused Fire, Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 2012, at A4.
70

As another example, consider the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration [PHMSA]’s implementation of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-355 §5, 116
Stat. 2985, 2988-89, which charged it to issue standards for public education about pipeline hazards. For this task, hardly
an NTTAA “performance-based or design-specific technical specification,” PHMSA turned to the American Petroleum
Institute, which produced a 50+-page standard PHMSA proposed to incorporate by reference. PHMSA then did
incorporate API’s standard by reference, after a public rulemaking process that was devoid of access to the proposed
standard or its supporting materials. See n. 34 above.
71

Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.32d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“It is not consonant with the
purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of . . . data that, critical degree, is known only to
the agency.”).
72

As 5 U.S.C. §553(3) describes the substance of the required notice, it is to include “either the terms or substance
of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.” Judge Leventhal’s extension of this to
scientific data and reports is perhaps best understood as a response to the changes recently worked by the 1964 Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, under which such information would almost inevitably have to be supplied in
(continued...)
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it has won near-universal acceptance.73 Executive Order 12,866, which since 1993 has constituted
the President’s instruction to agencies how they are to conduct their more important rulemakings,
embodies both this obligation and an obligation (also hard to connect with statutory language)
actually to provide a draft of the proposed regulation, by which means a proposal to incorporate by
reference can be seen.74 In the computer age, a Federal Data Management Service provides the site
on which all this material is to be posted, readily searchable by any interested member of the public.

At the point of final rulemaking, to which Part 51 is only addressed, its controls are slight. It
requires the agency to provide OFR with one physical copy of the material to be incorporated,75
which is then stored in the National Archives where the public might find it. It must persuade OFR

72

(...continued)
response to a request. See Peter L. Strauss, Statutes that Are Not Static: The Case of the APA, 14 J. Contemp. Leg.
Issues 767 (2005).
73

American Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 237 (D.C. Cir. 2008)(“It would appear to be a fairly obvious
proposition that studies upon which an agency relies in promulgating a rule must be made available during the
rulemaking in order to afford interested persons meaningful notice and an opportunity to comment.”). But see id. at 24546 (Kavanuagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Portland Cement doctrine cannot be squared with
the text of § 553 of the APA.”); in FDMS Docket OMB-2012-0003-0066, at 7, the Small Business Administration Office
of Advocacy commented
Data and analysis that support a private technical standard used by a Federal agency should be held to the same
standard [of quality, objectivity, utility and integrity, and ... i]f an agency is unable to provide reasonable access
to the data and analysis or unable to resolve significant Information Quality challenges to a standard, it should
not use that standard.
74

Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (“For
each matter . . . , the issuing agency shall provide to OIRA the text of the draft regulatory action . . . .”); id., § 6(a)(E)
(“After the regulatory action has been published in the Federal Register or otherwise issued to the public, the agency shall
make available to the public the information set forth in subsections (a)(3)(B) and (C) . . . .”).
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1 CFR 51.5(a)(2).
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that the material to be incorporated is useable (a managable print file),76 a “requirement,”77 and
“substantially reduces the volume of material published in the Federal Register”;78 and the agency
must state in the regulation’s language of incorporation “where and how copies may be examined
and readily obtained with maximum convenience to the user.”79 In practice, however, “maximum
convenience to the user” is satisfied by the presence of a one physical copy of the standard in the
NARA archives, and another in the incorporating agency’s Washington-area reading room.80 That
the incorporated material must be a “requirement,” not an element of the statute,81 entails that the
material once successfully incorporated will impose legal obligations. Otherwise undefined in the
regulation, OFRs attention to “reasonably available” in Part 51 involves no consideration whatever
of the price the standard’s owner may be charging for access to it, now or in future years, or the
conditions being placed on that access.

Neither does OFR’s regime give any assurance about the continued availability of the incorporated standard, other than through the two printed copies in storage at different locations in or near
76

1 CFR 51.7(a)(4).

77

1 C.F.R. 51.9(b)(3).

78

1 CFR 51.7(a)(3).

79

1 CFR 51.9(b)(4).
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E.g., see n. 37 above.

81

The greater part of 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1), set out at p. 7 above, requires Federal Register publication of material
(e.g., “descriptions of its central and field organization”) that does not qualify as a “requirement.” Even subsection (D)
requires publication not only of “substantive rules of general applicability,” but also of “statements of general policy or
interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency” – i.e., soft, not hard, law. It does not
appear from the pages of the Federal Register that these obligations have been rigorously enforced – understandable
enough from the perspective of protecting its volume – and in any event in the age of the Internet the right place for these
documents is not on the pages of one day’s printed and imperfectly indexed Federal Register, but on agency websites
where later statutes require them to be maintained and Boolean searches are generally available.
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Washington, D.C. (which might in practice become quite difficult to access). Doubtless responding
to concerns about delegation of lawmaking authority to private bodies, the OFR regulation is
emphatic that incorporation “is limited to the edition of the publication that is approved [that is, to
the edition that the agency has itself identified and decided to make legally obligatory]. Future
amendments or revisions of the publication are not included.”82 Because revising an incorporated
standard would require a fresh round of notice and comment rulemaking, adopted standards often
remain law long after the organizations that initially drafted them have updated them – as in the case
of the AHPA standards discussed above.83

Thus, although creating legal obligations through incorporation by reference, under the OFR
regime, saves agency resources at the initial stage of incorporation, it does so at the cost of making
change expensive. The result, as already noted, is that although ANSI’s “Essential Requirements”84
require standards organizations revisit their standards every few years, to keep them current, the

82

1 CFR 51.1(f). State courts have rejected regulations giving legal force to future versions of standards (“Houses
in this town must be built in conformity to the current standards of the Southern Building Code Congress International
model building code”) as improper delegations of public authority into private hands. See, e.g., Blitch v. City of Ocala,
195 So. 406 (Fla. 1940) (holding that municipal ordinance requiring roofing shingles corresponding to National Board
of Fire Underwriters standards would be invalid if it included future changes); Hillman v. N. Wasco Cnty. People’s Util.
Dist., 323 P.2d 664, 671 (Or. 1958) (finding unconstitutional adoption of national electrical code that changes from time
to time); City of Chamberlain v. R.E. Lein, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 130, 133 (S.D. 1994) (invalidating law that delegates to
the American Institute of Architects by requiring public contracts to include provisions from an AIA standardized form);
Brookhaven Baymen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Southampton, 926 N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (invalidating
law that gave private Board of Trustees ability to change shellfish regulations in the future). It seems a different question,
though, whether an incorporation by reference is permissible only if it is a requirement – that is, only if it carries
mandatory force. See n. 77 above. “Since the 1970s, the Federal Register has refused to provide copyright protection
to private standards unless the agency incorporates them into a formal rule in the CFR” which greatly complicates
revision. ... [T]he inability to accommodate frequent change is a particular obstacle to broader implementation of
conformity assessment and complex technology standards.” FDMS Docket OMB-2012-0003-0049 and NARA-20120002-0118 (Comments of Scott Rafferty, former Deputy General Counsel of ACUS 4-5, emphasis in original).
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Text at n. 37 above.
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N. 5 above.
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majority of standards incorporated into federal regulations were incorporated before 1996.85

The arrival of the Internet and agency electronic reading rooms has both eliminated the spacesaving rationale for incorporation by reference as it has been done until now, and created new
obligations of government transparency. Both developments call into particular question the
financial side-effect of incorporation by reference, that people might be made to pay private
organizations to obtain access to the standards governing their conduct. The electronic reading
rooms have no real limits on size; they can readily hyperlink to documents maintained on other web
sites; and standard search engines permit rapidly focusing on materials of interest. The Electronic
Freedom of Information Act of 1996,86 in requiring the creation of electronic reading rooms, brought
to light and ready public access the enormous range of agency materials other than regulations that
might influence their regulatory conduct. Now the effect of 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2)87 was to oblige
agencies to make all their guidance materials that did not have to be published in the Federal
Register available in their electronic reading rooms, if the agencies wished them to have any impact
85

See text at p. 44 below.

86

Pub L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat 3048 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).

87

5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2) provides, in relevant part,

“Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying ...
“(B)those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency and are not published in
the Federal Register;
“(C)administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public; ...
“A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the
public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency only if—
“(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided by this paragraph; or
“(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.”
It is perhaps noteworthy that this section permits excision of materials only “to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy” and makes no provision for incorporation by reference.
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on private conduct. Strikingly, the qualities of guidance documents are just those generally associated with voluntary consensus standards. They identify means for achieving a certain result, such
as one that regulations may require, without in themselves limiting the possibility of achieving that
result by other means. The E-Government Act of 200288 carried this transparency impulse one step
further. It not only requires the migration of rulemaking activities to the more accessible and
transparent web, but also makes clear that the electronic docket it mandates for all rulemaking is to
be comprehensive, containing all materials relevant to the rulemaking process. In consequence of
these developments, today only SDO copyright claims obstruct ready public access to rulemaking
proposals, to the data that supports them, and to resulting legal obligations. The strong general
impulse of federal law is to require transparency of measures that will affect public obligations.89

B. Copyright preservation as affirmative federal policy?
Congress, the NTTAA, NIST and the OMB

Perhaps the strongest case to be made for the current state of affairs is that in recent years
Congress has consistently relied on voluntary consensus standards as a preferred source of regulatory obligation. When in 1970 it created OSHA, Congress instructed it to adopt consensual
workplace safety standards in the absence of a showing of their inadequacy; as a means quickly to

88

Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat 2899 (codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C. (2006)).

89

One might even invoke here the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§1531-32, which set the
federal government’s face against regulatory measures exporting costs to others including the private sector. While no
individual regulation would cross the high fiscal threshold set for invocation of the Act’s mandatory terms, the collective
annual cost to the private sector of having to pay private bodies for access to proposed or promulgated legal obligations
created by incorporation by reference is substantial, if hard to calculate. The Act’s policy impulse is clear.
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establish a floor of enforceable legal obligation unlikely to prove controversial to industry (though
perhaps less than optimal from a labor perspective).90 When the Consumer Product Safety Commission was established in 1972, it was similarly instructed.91 Then in 1995, building on an OMB
Circular (A-119) first issued in the Reagan Administration,92 the NTTAA generalized the proposition,93 requiring a preference for both the use of voluntary consensus standards rather than selfgenerated rules, and agency participation, where permitted, in their generation. The statute rested
on perceptions that these standards embody greater technical expertise than the government is
generally able to assemble, result from more efficient processes, are more acceptable (if consensual)
to the industry involved than government imposition of mandatory standards would be, and are
generated without significant cost to the public. Its administration was assigned to the National
Institute of Standards and Measures [NIST], an agency Congress had established in 1988 in the
Department of Commerce to take over the responsibilities previously held by its National Bureau
of Standards.94

None of these statutes addresses the copyright question, and the absence of attention is perhaps

90

29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (2006).
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This history, and much else of value in understanding the history and sweep of standards development, may be
found in Harm Scheppel, The Constitution of Private Governance 93 ff. (Hart 2005)
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See H.R. Rep. No. 104-390, at 25 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 493, 511 (“OMB Circular A-119 was
originally promulgated in 1982 and revised in 1993. It requires federal agencies to adopt and use standards, developed
by voluntary consensus standards bodies, and to work closely with these organizations to ensure that developed standards
are consistent with agency needs.”).
93

Text at p. 8 above.

94

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5111-5115, 102 Stat. 1107, 1427-

1433.
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especially striking in the NTTAA, which is primarily concerned with the treatment, including the
financial treatment, of patents that result from shared government and private technology development. OMB’s circular A-119, which in its most recent (1998) revision is an implementation of the
NTTAA’s limited provisions on the use of standards, does state that “If a voluntary standard is used
and published in an agency document, your agency must observe and protect the rights of the
copyright holder and any other similar obligations,”95 and copyright protection was clearly a matter
of concern to those who had participated in the notice and comment process leading to the Circular’s promulgation.96 Yet the discussion studiously avoids discussing just what those rights might
be, and of particular interest in this regard is a comment apparently limiting the circular’s intended
scope to other than regulatory requirements:
“35. A few commentators inquired whether the Circular applies to "regulatory standards." In
response, the final Circular distinguishes between a "technical standard," which may be referenced in a regulation, and a "regulatory standard," which establishes overall regulatory goals or
outcomes. The Act and the Circular apply to the former, but not to the latter. As described in the
legislative history, technical standards pertain to "products and processes, such as the size,
strength, or technical performance of a product, process or material" and as such may be
incorporated into a regulation. [See 142 Cong. Rec. S1080 (daily ed. February 7, 1996) (Statement of Sen. Rockefeller.)] Neither the Act nor the Circular require any agency to use private
sector standards which would set regulatory standards or requirements.”97
If the NTTAA and the Circular, then, do not apply to “regulatory requirements,” it would appear
that they do not apply to incorporations that set legal obligations, as distinct from incorporations
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Sec. 6(j), 63 F.R. 8546, 8555 (Feb. 19, 1998).
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63 F.R. at 8548 and 8550.
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63 F.R. at 8549. In offering the amendment that was adopted as §12(d) of the NTTAA, Senator Rockefeller hd
remarked that the NTTAA was limited to to “standards pertaining to products and processes, such as the size strength,
or technical performance of a product, process, or material,” differentiating those standards from “private sector attempts
to set regulatory standards or requirements. For example, we do not intend for the Government to have to follow any
attempts by private standard bodies to set specific environmental regulations.” 142 Cong. Rec. S1078 (Feb. 7, 1996).
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establishing permitted means by which legal obligations may be met. Preserving copyright for the
latter sort of incorporation, if OFR permitted it (as it will be argued below they should),98 would
neither challenge the proposition that law is not subject to copyright, nor appear to confer on private
parties the power to place a monopoly price on access to knowledge of one’s legal obligations.

The strength of federal law in encouraging coordination between SDOs and national regulators
is reflected as well in congressional limitations of the possibility of antitrust enforcement against
SDOs even when, as has happened, standard-setting is used by active participants in their processes
to gain commercial advantage over competitors.99 The market’s awareness that one boiler does, and
another does not, satisfy an AMSE safety standard can drive the maker of the latter out of business
– and the maker of the first may be able to secure that determination by its position in the standards
development organization.100 So, too, if the makers of steel conduits for electric wiring are able to
exclude polyvinyl chloride (PVC) conduit as an approved type of electrical conduit in the National
Electrical Code,101 or if the manufacturer of new tanks for containing hazardous materials is able to
cause disapproval of a new technology that, by facilitating repair of leaky tanks already in place,

98

See pp. 31 above and ? below.
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Professor Christopher Sagers has extensively considered the antitrust issues in a series of law review articles,
Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting Organizations: A Case Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1393, 1398-1402 (2004) ; The Myth of "Privatization" 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2007); Standardization and
Markets: Just Exactly Who Is the Government, and Why Should Antitrust Care? 89 ORE.L.REV. 785 (2011). See also
Wolf, op. cit. n. 3 above; and see n. 104 below.
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American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 559-62 (1982).
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Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495-98 (1988)(noting that polyvinyl chloride
conduit was rejected only after steel interests “recruited 230 persons to join the [National Fire Protection] Association
and to attend the annual meeting to vote against the proposal”). The National Electric Code is a set of standards created
under the aegis of the National Fire Protection Association, not itself law although its standards are often incorporated
by reference in local building codes.
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would cut into its market.102 Should the standards in question have been converted into legal
obligations through incorporation by reference, the anti-competitive impact would be all the
stronger. While one might suppose the antitrust laws offered control over such behaviors, a
combination of Supreme Court judgments103 and congressional actions104 has seriously weakened
if not eliminated that possibility. Yet, like the NTTAA and Circular A-119, what these measures
address are “voluntary consensus standards” creating “technical standards,” and not any legal
obligations – “regulatory standards or requirements”105 – that might result from the manner of their
incorporation by reference.

In practice, agencies and SDOs have understood both the NTTAA and Circular A-119 to
preserve SDO copyrights past the point of incorporation.106 Circular A-119's instruction to “observe

102
Sessions Tank Liners, Inc., v. Joor Manufacturing Co., 17 F.3d 295, 296-98 (9th Cir., 1994)(describing approval
of revision of Uniform Fire Code that rejected plaintiff company’s tank-lining operation after defendant company’s
president influenced subcommittee to reject the lining)..
103

Thus, the antitrust immunity for outcomes characterized as the result of successful petitioning of government for
legal change, established by E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), while somewhat modified in Allied Tube, n. 100
above, successfully defeated antitrust liability in Joor, n. 102 above.
104

Reacting to FTC efforts to use antitrust laws to control SDO anti-competitive activity, the Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, §7, 94 Stat. 374, 376 (May 28, 1980), (codified asat 15
U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B)), provides that "the Commission shall not develop or promulgate any trade rule or regulation with
regard to the regulation of the development and utilization of the standards and certification activities ... "; the Standards
Development Organization Advancement (SDO) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305) significantly limits the antitrust exposure of SDOs that engage only in "developing,
promulgating, revising, amending, reissuing, interpreting, or otherwise maintaining a voluntary consensus standard, or
using such standard in conformity assessment," id. § 4301(a)(7). The Act strongly expresses congressional approval of
federal use of voluntary consensus standards, yet in doing so makes explicit reference to the provisions of the NTTAA
and OMB Circular A-119 that appear to imagine their use as means to satisfy regulatory requirements rather than as the
requirements themselves. See n. 97 above.
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N. 97 above.
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See, e.g., the discussion of NAESB’s recently announced copyright practice at p. 53 within.
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and protect the rights of the copyright holder”107 might have been understood as an instruction to
secure in advance an SDO’s permission to convert its privately generated standard into a public
legal obligation. One can imagine bargained prices, or perhaps that this would constitute a taking
that must be paid for, In either case, one suspects that the resulting prestige and the possibility of
competition amongst standard-setters would keep prices down if not eliminate them.108 Instead, the
call for respecting copyright has been taken to permit keeping the law private and to let copyright
holders charge those who must comply with it monopoly prices for knowledge of it. The fear has
been that rendering the standards-made-law public would undermine the business model necessary
to sustain the SDOs’ important work.109 And this impulse has only been strengthened as agency
budgets have shrunk (alongside, correspondingly, agency capacity to self-generate regulations or,
for that matter, effectively to oversee private standard-setting). Little if any attention has been given
to the impact of the Internet, and the increasing expectations about the availability of government
information it has engendered, on the considerations at play. The effect, as has been widely
observed,110 has been to transfer wide swathes of law-making into private hands.
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Sec. 6(j).
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See p. 20 above.
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James A. Thomas, A Business Model That Works, Standardization News, May/June 2010, available at
http://www.astm.org/PRESIDENT/mj10_a_business_model_that_works.html ; Am. Nat. Standards Inst., Why Voluntary
Consensus Standards Incorporated by Reference into Federal Government Regulations are Copyright Protected 3 (2011),
available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/News%20and%20Publications/Critical%20Issues/Copyright%20on%20Standards%20in%20Regulations/Copyright%20on%20Standards%20in%20Regulation.pdf.
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See, e.g., Nina Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to Public Law: The Puzzling Federal Regulatory Use
of Private Standards, __ Mich.L.Rev ___ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2264321; Buthe &
Mattli, n. 4 above, Cunningham, n. 45 above, Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
543 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 193 (2007); Katie M. Colendich,
Note, Who Owns “The Law”? The Effect on Copyrights When Privately-Authored Works Are Adopted or Enacted by
Reference into Law, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 589 (2003),.

-39-

C. Possibilities of Change – An Administrative Conference Study, Rulemaking Proposal, and
Reconsideration of OMB Circular A-119

Incorporation by reference recently surfaced as an issue of concern in the work of the Administrative Conference of the United States. Building on extensive analysis by staff members, notably
Emily Bremer,111 the Conference considered and adopted a number of thoughtful recommendations
on incorporation by reference practice.112 However, the ACUS recommendations address themselves only to agency practice, and neither to the responsibilities of the Director nor to the sufficiency of Part 51, in the information age, to govern the question of reasonable availability.

For example, the recommendations urge agencies to address incorporation by reference issues
at the stage of notice of proposed rulemaking.113 They call attention to the need for proposed
incorporations to be available at the rulemaking proposal stage, observing that the opportunity to
comment on a proposal is illusory if one cannot know what it is that is being proposed. They take
approving notice of the practice of some federal agencies, that negotiate free read-only access on
standards organizations’ websites during comment periods to any standards that are proposed to be

111

Emily Schleicher Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in Federal Regulations (2011), available at
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/10/Revised-Draft-IBR-Report-10-19-11.pdf, subsequently
revised and published at Incorporation by Reference in an Open Government Age, 36 Harv. J L. & Pub. Pol. 133 (2013);
Scott Raferty, former Deputy General Counsel of ACUS, filed extensive comments in the NARA and OMB dockets, n.
82 above taking somewhat variant positions more supportive of the analysis offered in this Essay.
112
Administrative Conference of the United States, Administrative Conference Recommendation 2011-5:
Incorporation by Reference (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/acus-recommendations/incorporation-by-reference/
(visited December 4, 2012).
113

Id. At 5-6.
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incorporated by reference, as a means of fortifying the comment process.114 But they suggest only
a preference for such measures, and do not recommend that the Director of the Office of the Federal
Register make their public availability during the comment period a requisite element of “reasonably available.” Similarly, while encouraging the use of standards that can be accessed without the
payment of a fee, and acknowledging decisions supporting the proposition that law is not subject to
copyright, the recommendations accept the possibility that the public will be required to pay
copyright holders to learn the content of standards that by incorporation have been transformed into
law governing their conduct.115 Their acceptance of this state of affairs is grounded in the long
period of usage, and in readings of the legislation and presidential guidance that fail to note their
differentiation between “technical standards” and “regulatory standards or requirements.”116 No
consideration is given to the effect of continued copyright protection of what has become law, after
it has ceased to represent a contemporary voluntary consensus standard. Thus, the ACUS recommendations remain open to the possibility that, even when the incorporation of standards by
reference converts them into legal obligations, the “owner” of the standards can require the public
to pay whatever license fees they might choose to charge, for access to them under whatever
conditions of use and/or distribution they might choose to impose, and well past their continued
relevance as “voluntary consensus standards.”

114

Id. At 3.

115

Ms. Bremer’s Report does acknowledge at p.2 that “There is some ambiguity in current law regarding the current
scope of copyright protection for materials incorporated into regulations, as well as the question of what uses of such
materials might constitute ‘fair use’ under section 107 of the Copyright Act.” (citing Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l,
Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Whether and Under What Circumstances Government Reproduction of
Copyrighted Materials is a Noninfringing “Fair Use” under Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 23 Op. O.L.C.
87 (1999), but the resulting recommendation assumes that copyrights may be protected.
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The author, with 23 others, subsequently filed a petition for rulemaking with the OFR urging it
to revise Part 51 to reflect the changes brought about by the information age, and to impose two new
conditions on incorporation by reference: first, that any proposal must demonstrate that the standards had been made available without charge on commenter request during the comment period for
the proposed rule; and second, that if and to the extent the proposed incorporation creates a legal
obligation, the text of that obligation too must be available without charge to any member of the
affected public.117 The first condition reflected ACUS’ advice to agencies to arrange access during
the comment period, that might be restricted to commenters and protected through digital rights
management; but in addressing it, sought to convert this advice into a requirement that would be
consonant with contemporary law and practice. The second condition would have required public
availability of any incorporated standards that had become “regulatory standards or requirements.”118

The basic thrust of the petition was to urge revision of the federal practice to encourage the use
of standards as guidance, identifying means of complying with regulations independently stated,
rather than themselves constituting legal obligations. This, it was urged, would avoid the problem
of copyrighting law, while protecting the intellectual property of organizations able to identify
effective means of compliance with law. It would also solve the problem of stasis in incorporated

117

The full submission was not published in the Federal Register, but may be found in the resulting FDMS Docket
NARA-2012-0002-0002.
118

N. 97 above.
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standards. Agencies using soft rather than hard law techniques would be free to identify new means
of compliance using guidance mechanisms, without having to undertake the formalities of noticeand-comment rulemaking.

A month after the OFR published this petition in the Federal Register with an invitation for
comment,119 OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis [OIRA] published there an
additional request for comment, in connection with its possible revision of Circular A-119.120 This
notice, too, raised questions about copyright protection for incorporated standards.121 The resulting
FDMS docket for the OFR petition122 contains 162 items, and for the OIRA docket123 74, exploring
a wide range of issues and perspectives.

These are captured as well in the growing literature

addressing the importance of privately generated standards to an increasingly global economy.

SDO comments generally invoke the necessity of financial support for their valuable work, the
difficulties government agencies would face if they themselves attempted to generate standards, the
expense agencies would face, in times of budgetary stringency, if they themselves had to purchase
licenses broadly to publish the standards they incorporate, the federal policies encouraging the use
of SDO standards and the protection of SDO intellectual property in them, and the safeguards of

119

77 F.R. 11414 (Feb. 27, 2012).

120

77 F.R. 19357 (March 30, 2012).
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Id. At 19359.
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FDMS Docket NARA-2012-0002.

123

FDMS Docket OMB-2012-0003/
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standards-generating processes that meet the ANSI “essential requirements” – openness, lack of
dominance, balance, coordination, public engagement through notice and the consideration of views
and objections, and adoption by consensus.124 While frequently asserting that the prices charged for
standards are “reasonable,” none of the SDO comments suggests a means for regulating prices,
either at the moment of incorporation or thereafter. Nor do they address the rulemaking petition’s
suggestion that agencies use voluntary consensus standards not to impose regulatory requirements,
but as acceptable means for achieving compliance with regulatory requirements independently
stated. The SDOs apparently prefer uses of incorporation that create legal obligations (and so
undergird their markets).

Although many of the comments supporting the petition were brief, emphatic statements to the
effect that legal obligations must be public, a number of NGOs, consumer groups, and trade
associations representing small businesses wrote in some detail. PublicResource, an organization
that has been conducting a self-help campaign to place standards on the Internet, defying the SDOs
to sue it for copyright violation, filed numerous comments in both dockets; in addition to strenuously insisting on the public’s need for access to the law that governs it, its comments catalogue a
wide range of problems in the incorporation by reference system: that of the 9,486 incorporated
standards registered by NIST, 6,194 predate 1996;125 that Underwriters Laboratories today charges
124

N. 5 above. See also FDMS docket OMB-2012-0003-0024, at 7-8 (Comments from Am. Nat. Standards Inst.);
FDMS docket OMB-2012-0003-0010, at 4 (Comments from Am. Soc. Of Mech. Eng’rs).
125

FDMS Docket NARA-2012-0002-0043, at 11. Poster children for this problem are a Coast Guard regulation
dating from 1941, 46 C.F.R. 160.041-2(b), requiring first aid kits to contain 100 tablets of phanacetin, a painkiller that
is internationally recognized as a carcinogen and cause of kidney failure, and a PHMSA regulation, 49 C.F.R.
173.32(c)(4), incorporating a 1943 standard for unfired pressure vessels. Comments of Public Resource Org., FDMS
(continued...)
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$849 to obtain a 1968 standard made law by OSHA in 29 CFR 1910;126 that numerous still mandatory standards are unavailable for purchase; that 536 are listed in the NIST database without an
associated date (a fundamental requirement); and that others simply cannot be found.127 The Section
of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice extensively addressed the proposition that law is not
subject to copyright.128 A variety of individuals and organizations involved with information
technology stressed both the success of standards generation in that field without copyright enforcement, and the undesirability of invoking the rulemaking rigidities that creation of legal norms
through incorporation by reference entails.129 Workers, small business entrepreneurs, and consum
125

(...continued)
Docket NARA-2012-0002-106, p. 2.
Scott Rafferty, echoing this concern, invokes the FDA’s insistence on a 1938 standard for sulfonated coal that is no
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•
•
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quickly evolving technologies;
Inadvertently disadvantaging certain market competitors;
Hindering market acceptance and penetration; and
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ers are typically missing or under-represented in standards development organizations – and
especially so from the working groups and subcommittees that perform the detail work on the
generation of standards.130 Small business trade associations asserted both the difficulties they
experienced in participating in standard-setting, and the financial burdens entailed by licensing
fees131; consumer groups stated their concerns with safety issues posed by standards developed,

129

•

(...continued)
Precluding a multi-faceted competitive environment. ...

Government agencies ... have a role to play, but they are most effective when facilitating voluntary processes rather than
imposing rigid mandates.”)
130

Cf. TAN100 above. Writing in 1978, Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Standards Development in the Private Sector:
Thoughts on Interest Representation and Procedural Fairness 7-8 (1978), reported the deep concern expressed by Calvin
J. Collier, then Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, during hearings for the Voluntary Standards and
Certification Act in 1975-1976 that the SDOs did not properly represent small businesses and consumers.
“It is of great importance that standards reflect a proper balance between the interests of all parties concerned,
considering available technology. These interests are best represented when affected persons participate in the
development process. Unfortunately, consumers and small businesses, for a variety of reasons, have often been
unable to participate. It is understandable, then, when standards favor parties whose financial strength gave them
a superior position in the process.”
Writing at about the same time, Robert Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of
Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1378 (1978):
Because [of] the ... industry orientation of most technical committees, the costs and complexity of increased safety
or purity will almost certainly be weighted more heavily by these committees than by an individual whose primary
concern is safety or health.... The welter of legislative enactments vesting issues of safety or health in the
governmental agencies suggests that for most people the balance provided by the private sector often fails to
accommodate health or safety considerations satisfactorily.
131

E.g., FDMS Docket OMB-2012-0003-0026 (TenderSpec, a user, on the difficulties of securing timely notice);
OMB-2012-0003-0034 (National Association of Convenience Stores; domination of Payment Card Industry Council by
large electronic payment companies resulted in standards subjecting others “to an elevated risk of fraud.”); OMB-20120003-0058 (National Propane Gas Association; $645 cost for accessing standards proposed to be incorporated by
refrence by PHMSA was “extremely excessive” for its small business membership); OMB-2012-0003-0066 (Small
Business Administration Office of Advocacy; “‘[C]onsensus,’ as implemented by major SDOs, can be manipulated to
achieve standards that advance a particular policy preference or create market opportunities for select providers but do
not represent a consensus among regulated entities. ... [C]ommittee leadership can identify a diversity of interests that
serves to dilute the voice of those parties most directly affected ... [and] small entities often lack the opportunity to
challenge the result.”; NARA-2012-0002-0145 (National Tank Truck Carriers; the comments emphasize the particular
problem of purchasing standards not yet incorporated in order to comment on NPRMs, and remark also that small
businesses “have no option but to purchase the material at whatever price is set by the body which develops and
(continued...)
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essentially, by industries with incentives to minimize risks to save costs.132

The published literature about incorporation recognizes, in particular, the significant chance that
standards will often favor the interests of established industry. Housing codes may favor rigid water
piping requiring the services of plumbers over flexible piping that both is more readily used by do-

131
(...continued)
copyrights the information. ... [W]e cite the need for many years for the tank truck industry to purchase a full publication
from the Compressed Gas Association just to find out what the definition of a ‘dent’ was. ... HM241 could impact up
to 41,366 parties and ... there is no limit on how much the bodies could charge ... ”; NARA-2012-0002-0147 (American
Foundry Society; “$75 is not much for a standard, but a typical small manufacturer, including a foundry, may be subject
to as many as 1000 standards. The ASTM foundry safety standard alone cross-references 35 other consensus standards
and that is just the tip of the iceberg ...”).

Particularly revealing of these problems are the comments of the National Grain & Feed Ass’n, NARA-2012-0002-0153,
addressing an OSHA proposal to amend its grain handling regulation associated with fires and explosions, 29 CFR
1910.272. OSHA had issued an ANPRM suggesting that it would deal replace existing regulatory text by incorporating
National Fire Protection Association Standard 61. Yet, as NGFA observed,
“NFPA standards offer a far more complex, stringent protocol that may be adopted in whole or in part by industry
participants, voluntarily. These guidelines play an important role as voluntary practices that can enhance safety
efforts. But they are entirely inappropriate as a replacement for effective rulemaking ...A review and
comparison of 1910.272 and NFPA 61 reveals that there are more than 146 additional provisions addressing design,
construction, and operation of affected grain handling facilities. Neither the NFPA technical commitee, nor any
other NFPA committee, conducts [either] an economic impact study ... [or] consider the impact of the feasibility or
cost of its detailed recommendations on industry and small businesses, in particular. ... Only NFPA participants, who
are required to pay to play, have the ability to comment in the development of consensus standards.”
At 2-3; emphasis in original.
132

See, e.g., FDMS Docket OMB-2012-0003-0060 (Consumer Federation of America; assuring the adequacy of
voluntary safety standards requires not only consensus among participants, but also adequate consumer participation,
a transparent process with shared, understandable information, agency participation in the consensus process AND
regulatory oversight for adequacy, such that the standard is not “wholly controlled by industry”); NARA-2012-0002-0092
(Pipeline Safety Trust, assserting that the PHMSA had incorporated by reference 85standards privately developed by
trade assiations, “deliver[ing] value to members” and not engaging the public.) As an example,the trust invoked the
API’s development of the Public Awareness standard, RP 1162, then incorporated by reference by PHMSA, and for
which it attempted to charge a House Committee $1195 for access, see p. 14 above:
“The process was controlled by industry, even though industry has no particular expertise ... [and the] many possible
independent experts and organizations in the field ... were not sought and ultimately were not a part of the
development of this standard.” (At 5) “[T]his is not a ‘voluntary consensus standard’ – this is an industry standard
developed by and for industry. Nor is it a technical standard as that term was defined by Congress in the NTTAA.
... RP 1162 is a 50+ page long set of recommendations, options, considerations, and possibilities.” (At 9, emphasis
in original)).
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it-yourselfers and also could permit some uses to which rigid piping is not well adapted.133

... [I]ndustry representatives tend to dominate decisionmaking in many nonprofit
organizations, and the standards that are produced tend to reflect the self-interest of
the corporations for whom the participants work.a The lack of non-industry representatives leads private standard-setting organizations to strike a different balance
between cost and protection than that favored by non-industry actors. ... [S]tandards
provide limited protection for workers in many cases, because industry-dominated
committees are more reluctant than OSHA to characterize a substance as a carcinogen, and less likely to rely on published scientific data instead of industry-supplied
information.b 117

At this writing, neither the OFR nor OIRA has acted. Congress has adopted a statute in

133

Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Goverrnance, 75 NYU L Rev. 534, 641 and n. 406. (2000); compare
TAN 37 above.
a

See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from
the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 124 (1993) (finding that "certain interest groups seem
consistently to get their way at the expense of others" in the UCC drafting process, and that the history of Article IV
demonstrates that, in particular, banks "consistently win out at the expense of their customers"); Robert E. Scott, The
Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1809, 1850-51 (1994) (finding impressionistic and empirical evidence that
the private legislative bodies that drafted Article 9 of the UCC tended to favor the interests of asset-based financiers over
consumer interests). See generally Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development
of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1380-83 (1978) (concluding that
three groups-small business, labor, and consumers-are not adequately represented in private organizations that write
nongovernmental standards affecting safety and health).
b
THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPA-TIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 283 (1993).
117

Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulations, 53 Duke L. J. 389, 407-08 (2003); the two footnotes
preceding this one, redesignated a and b, are elements of the quotation from Prof. Shapiro’s article.
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response to the API misjudgment in asking a House Committee to pay to see its pipeline safety
warning standard118 that has raised considerable anxiety in the SDO community, and resulted in a
number of meetings to address future directions. The remainder of this essay looks at possibilities
for SDOs to preserve at least the core of their business model, while permitting the public to
comment on rulemaking proposals and learn about the law’s obligations without having to pay what
might be monopoly prices to do so.

IV. CAN THE PUBLIC HAVE ITS ACCESS-TO-LAW CAKE AND STANDARDS DEVELOPERS EAT REVENUE FROM STANDARDS SALES TOO?

A. Proposed Rulemaking and Digital Rights Management

Given the current law of rulemaking, not to mention the transformations worked by the development of Regulations.gov and its associated FDMS, agencies have strong incentives to follow
ACUS’s recommendation to assure commenters access to SDO standards underlying their rulemaking proposals. Few agencies would wish to take the risk that an important rulemaking would be
found invalid, months if not years down the road, because they had failed to give commenters
adequate notice of the content of their proposals or the studies underlying them.119 For many wouldbe commenters, having to pay to learn the content of what is at the moment only a proposal for

118

P. 14 above..

119

Text at p. 29 above.
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rulemaking would be a disabling obstacle.120 Yet for the SDO, having to make public what at the
moment is only a voluntary standard, not yet a regulatory obligation, and thus unquestionably is still
under copyright, could threaten income necessary for its continued success. Might temporary access
under digital rights management regimes that sharply reduce if not eliminate threats of misappropriation, encouraged both by ACUS and by ANSI,121 provide one means by which this dilemma might
be softened?
Consider the approach taken by the North American Energy Standards Board [NAESB],122
which has used a commercial program, LockLizard Safeguard Secure Viewer,123 to permit requesters three days of one-time access to any standard the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[FERC] may propose to adopt as a regulatory requirement.124 The NAESB acts often in contemplation that FERC will adopt its standards as regulatory law, and its activities in support of FERC
rulemaking may illustrate ways in which SDOs can then facilitate rulemaking development building

120

N. 46 above.
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Conversation with Joe Bhatia, CEO, ANSI.

122

Conventional sources about the NAESB and its operations include William P. Boswell &James P. Cargas, North
American Energy Standards Board: Legal and Administrative Underpinnings of a Consensus Based Organization, 27
Energy L.J. 147 (2006) and FERC discussions of its use of NAESB in rulemaking statements of basis and purpose, such
as Order Providing Guidance on the Formation of a Standards Development Organization for the Wholesale Electric
Industry, 97 F.E.R.C. 'J 61,289 (2001), on reh'g, 99 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,171 (2002) and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, F.E.R.C. STATS. & REGS. ¶ 32,578,70 Fed. Reg.
319 (2005). Extensive conversations and correspondence with Rae McQuade, President and Chief Operating Officer
of the NAESB during September and October 2012 have also added greaatly to my understanding of the organization,
and the paragraphs about it that follow. NAESB is relied upon as well by state utility commissions and other SDOs.
Many of its roughly 3,000 standards have been incorporated by reference, and some are in use internationally. Although
NAESB is an SDO credentialed by ANSI, because its standards are so likely to be incorporated by reference, few of them
are made ANS standards.
123

http://www.locklizard.com/.

124

NAESB filed a detailed account of its copyright policy with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
November 12, 2012. http://www.naesb.org/pdf4/ferc112012_naesb_copyright.pdf, at p. 3.
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on SDO standards. A trade organization of about 300 corporate members with some regulatory
members as well,125 its work has become particularly important as “smart grids,” consumer choice,
and the possibility that some consumers will at times be supplying power to, but at other times
taking power from, electric transmission lines have become significant market realities. NAESB
has a particularly tight relationship with FERC’s regulation of interstate markets in electricity and
natural gas, and often initiates standards development at its request (and without seeking FERC
compensation for doing so).

In line with, and perhaps exceeding in some respects, the ANSI “essential requirements,”126
NAESB’s procedures for adopting standards provide at least those communities likely to be directly
affected by its work opportunities for influencing it that are readily comparable to federal rulemaking procedures. It develops its working agenda on the basis of inputs from many sources, often nonmembers. That agenda and most materials considered in the course of standard development are
readily viewed on its website. Its leadership asserted in conversation,127 although its webpage128
does not seem to show, that it regularly reaches out to non-member trade associations, consumer
advocates, etc., and that it is possible to join distribution lists to assure active notice of developments of possible interest. When NAESB submits standards to FERC (or other public bodies) for
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While its corporate members must pay a $6500 annual membership fee, any state utility commission may become
a member without fee, under the umbrella of a single annual $500 payment by the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners. At least California, Connecticut, Maine, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Vermont have
availed themselves of this possibility; the Department of Energy and NIST are also members.
126

N. 5 above..
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N. 122 above.

128

http://www.naesb.org.
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possible incorporation by reference, its submission includes full documentation of the proposal’s
development (committee minutes, voting records, submitted comments, etc.). As distinct from the
proposed standard itself, which may be purchased from NAESB or briefly accessed under digital
rights management, all this material is then publicly accessible during FERC’s comment period,
should FERC issue a notice of proposed rulemaking that would incorporate the standard by reference. In this respect, the material available to the public tracks much of what would be available
to the public commenting on a direct federal agency rulemaking proposal. An electronic filing of
September 18, 2012 respecting wholesale electric quadrant standards prints out at 395 pages.129

Yet the business model NAESB has developed well illustrates the tensions that may exist
between provision for open participation in standards generation and generation of the financial
resources required effectively to perform one’s function. Historically, non-members could freely
participate and vote on NAESB committees as they worked on standards development, and sixty to
seventy percent of participants on any given one topic were non-members. NAESB relied on its
members’ dues payments, together with sales revenues from standards, to finance its activities.
Recently, however, NAESB found that some utilities and other energy corporations, on which it
relied for its financial support, had become free-riders, depriving it of needed dues revenues by
availing themselves of its free access policy. Thus, NAESB has recently joined the many SDOs
requiring one to “pay to play” in an active sense. Non-members face charges for meeting participation by telephone or in person ($100 for a meeting of four hours or less; $300 for a longer one), or
for a year’s participation in the work of a given subcommittee ($1000). (There is no charge for the
129

http://www.naesb.org/pdf4/ferc_091812_weq_version003_report.pdf
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submission of comments, however, and any comments submitted must be considered).

Perhaps also to protect its revenue streams from free-riding, or its standards from “unintended”
display in official documents that would be freely available on agency websites, NAESB has
forcefully asserted its right to license (or refuse to license) their standards’ use in any agency
proceeding.130 In providing limited DRM access to its standards, as when they are proposed for
incorporation by reference in FERC, it withholds any right to quote from those standards in
comments to be filed with FERC (much less elsewhere) beyond what “fair use” permits.131 Anyone
who wants to reason with FERC about whether they ought to convert that standard into a regulatory
obligation or whether, it having been converted, they have complied with it or it bears on some
action for which they require regulatory approval, must now pay NAESB to quote its language in
their filings.

The NAESB is only one participant in a standards development activity that illustrates both the
importance of assuring continuing support for standards development, and its close relationship to
the kinds of activities American administrative law has long committed to fully open public notice
and participation. The generation and consumption of electric power has become notably more

130

N. 131 above.

131

“Except under the limited circumstances specifically permitted by the Fair Use Doctrine, NAESB considers it
a copyright infringement to quote any part of its standards as part of filings with the Commission. Such limited
circumstances may include Commission proceedings such as complaints, rate cases, and protests to rate cases. However,
parties should always consult with NAESB prior to the use of any verbatim quote of copyrighted material.” Id. At 5.
The NAESB filing contains no mention of rulemaking, and appears to be principally concerned with quotations made
in the course of compliance filings and/or tariffs – that is, filings likely to be made by organizations whose membership
it hopes to attract. Cf. text at n. 52 above. Membership in itself confers access to standards and while that access is
limited to internal use, id. at App. A-1, it also creates a relationship within which external uses may be bargained out.
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complex as new sources dependent on variable inputs (wind farms, solar panels) and possibilities
for co-generation have been added, national networks have expanded, and our awareness of
potential sources of disruption – solar storms, for example – has increased. Assuring stable, reliable
interoperability – what standards have long been about – has become the work of a Smart Grid
Interoperability Panel [SGIP] operating under the aegis of NIST.132 NIST’s recent Framework and
Roadmad for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 2.0133 runs 225 tightly packed pages,
citing 37 already identified standards, such as a suite of ANSI standards for data collection and
transmission,134 and an additional 61 still under review.135 In general, the standards have been
developed under NIST’s requirements for transparency, open participation, and “reasonable” (but
not free)136 accessibility; and, importantly for the purpose of this essay, FERC appears to have
accepted NIST advice that the standards are best used as “appropriate signals to the marketplace ...
without mandating compliance with particular standards. NIST adds that it would be impractical
and unnecessary for the Commission to adopt individual interoperability standards..”137 So long as
this advice is followed, the “law” problem with which this essay is concerned would not be present;
however, the fees the SGIP has found necessary to charge for participation in its deliberations, as
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“Today's electric power grid ranks as the single greatest engineering achievement of the 20th century. And
tomorrow's Smart Grid will be one of the greatest achievements of the 21st century. By linking information technologies
with the electric power grid—to provide "electricity with a brain"—the Smart Grid promises many benefits, including
increased energy efficiency, reduced carbon emissions, and improved power reliability.” http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/
133

(Feb. 2012), available at www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/NIST_Framework_Release_2-0_corr.pdf.
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The second of the listed standards appearing at pp. 70-105 of the printout.
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Id., p. 107 ff.

136

It perhaps bears repeating that there appear to be neither standards nor enforcement mechanisms in place to
determine what is a “reasonable” fee.
137

At p. 8, quoting http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20110719143912RM11-2-000.pdf, p. 6.
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well as its impending conversion from NIST dependency into an independent NGO that must be
sustained by substantial dues requirements,138 well illustrate the financial imperatives present in our
reliance on SDOs for standards creation.

B. Standards Developed in the Expectation of Incorporation

Perhaps in rulemaking comments one could avoid the need to quote extensive language from the
standard being proposed for incorporation. Any quotations might readily be brief enough to fit
comfortably within the dimensions of “fair use.” And perhaps the temporal, one-time-only limit
NAESB imposes on the free DRM access it offers to its standard – at that moment still merely a
voluntary standard – should be regarded as sufficiently enabling of the comment process. Once a
standard has been converted into a legal obligation, however, needs that the regulated and regulatory
beneficiaries may have for access to its terms are permanent, not time-limited, and may be frequent.
Even more striking, NAESB says it is prepared to enforce the proposition that its language may not
be quoted even in documents submitted to the regulator whose law it is, without a license from it at
the price it chooses to charge.139 While its members have free access to its standards, they have it
only for their internal use. The standards are not to be shared with others.

Perhaps NAESB’s concern is again with free-riding – that publication of its standards in public
pleadings, or even the possibility of repeated access to them, might create a purchase substitute for

138

139

https://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/July2012McDonaldLetter.
P. 53 above.
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those who could otherwise be steady customers. The concerns seem overdrawn. Neither participants before FERC nor FERC itself will be likely to have any need to quote standards in extenso in
proceedings in which they may be at issue, as compared to those aspects of them important to the
case zt hand. The doctrine of “fair use” seems well suited to situations in which quotation might
reasonably be thought compelled. And the use of digital rights management for controlled access,
at any time when access is needed, seems the modern equivalent of the law-library access Congress
imagined in requiring a finding of reasonable availability when it enacted §552(a)(1).140

At root of the issue here may be the nature of NAESB’s close relationship with FERC. If it is
not quite the SBCCI, nonetheless it is developing its standards, not as voluntary standards under the
primary hope that they may prove persuasive in market operations, but precisely in the contemplation that they will be a useful product for FERC to incorporate into legal obligations. Perhaps
driven by budgetary considerations or by the statutory preference for voluntary standards embodied
in the NTTAA, FERC in effect has asked NAESB to develop standards that it might have formulated through rulemaking of its own. Similarly, it appears, PHMSA relied on API to generate its
public pipeline safety hazard warning standards.141 Neither the NAESB nor the API standards are
“technical” standards in NTTAA terms, and self-evidently they are standards in which the public as
well as the members of NAESB or API would have a considerable interest. It should be quickly
apparent that the outsourcing is essentially contractual, making the opportunity to bargain for price,
and the reasons for doing so, strong. If NAESB or API thought it needed compensation for the
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See text at n. ? above.

141

See text at n. 34 above.
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work an agency was effectively delegating to it, that could have been agreed upon at the outset –
with the result that the work-product, as law, would then have been public.142 And if this were a
public contracting process with, say, a “request for proposal” [RFP] process, it is at least possible
that a less “interested” applicant would appear. The prospect of competition to provide this service
for the agency would be real (as would be the possibility that the agency would decide that selfproduction would be preferable) and any opportunity for monopoly pricing of law would have been
eliminated.

Effectively outsourcing rulemaking not only suggests a level of trust in the disinterestedness of
the standard-setter that not all persons affected by its standards might find warranted, but it also has
the potential of defeating many of the procedural safeguards of federal notice-and-comment
rulemaking, hiding from public (and agency) view the data, formative private inputs and even
reasoning that FDMS dockets reveal to all.143 Negotiating in advance the terms of what is in effect
contracted-out rulemaking would permit the rulemaking agency to specify the procedures by which
the desired standards will be generated: what and how notice will be given; whether persons wishing
to participate can be required to “pay to play,” as is often SDO practice; lodging the full records of
the standards-generation process with the rulemaking agency as a public record that will be available during the agency’s own notice-and-comment process; the nature of explanations the SDO
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One might also believe that PHMSA, in entering into such an agreement, should also be insisting upon API’s
achieving the levels of openness about data relied upon, views submitted, and reasoning to which it itself would be held
in notice-and-comment rulemaking – considerably more, as has been suggested, than ANSI’s Essential Requirements
entail – but that is an argument for another day.
143

Cf. Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), privatization(s), constitutionalization and statization: Icons and experiences
of sovereignty in the 21st century, 11 Int. J. Const. L. 162 (Oxford 2013).
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should give for controverted policy choices made; etc. NAESB’s procedures may have met some
of these standards; about API there is more room for doubt. Without such measures, an agency’s
reduction of the cost of conducting its own subsequent rulemaking, can have the consequence of
considerably reducing the visibility of and the public’s access to the standards-generation process.

Moreover, NAESB’s approach post-adoption, when its standards have been converted into legal
obligation, is questionably justified for an SDO that has created its standards in coordination with
an agency and in expectation of their incorporation. Here, Veeck144 has its clearest application, as
does Professor Cunningham’s persuasive typology.145 Unhindered digital right management access
to incorporated standards might, in this context, be seen as an acceptable middle ground, preserving
the print market likely to be used by those having to consult the standards as a whole and with
regularity. And it marks an approach under active consideration in the SDO community. The
National Fire Protection Association permits access to all of its incorporated standards under digital
rights management at any time, without charge.146 Its codes as a whole, rendered in portable form,
are what have sustaining value in the market – and of course their incorporation as legal obligations
significantly arms that market.147 ANSI, at this writing, is actively exploring with its member
144

TAN. 47 above
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TAN 45 above and pp. following.
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James M. Shannon, President’s Report (2012) (“More than ten years ago we put all of our codes and standards
on our website and made them available to anyone who wants to review them. On our RealRead site the standards cannot
be downloaded or printed but anyone can read all of our codes and standards online without paying a fee. We were the
first standards developing organization to do that.” Available at
http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=2218&itemID=51934&URL=Training/Conferences/NFPA%20Con
ference%20&%20Expo/General%20Session/(Visited December 26, 2012).
147

That portable form, NFPA realizes, increasingly must be digital, and its business model is being changed to
(continued...)
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ship the possibility of establishing a central DRM database for accessing incorporated standards;
perhaps the Office of the Federal register and/or the Small Business Administration will be persuaded to join in the enterprise.148

C. Standards Developed Independently of Any Expectation of Their Incorporation

The preceding paragraphs have largely concerned standards created in direct contemplation of
their immediate use by government bodies. Matters are somewhat different for voluntary consensus
standards that have been created without expectation of their possible incorporation as legal
obligations – particularly in cases in which the agency wishes/needs to incorporate only a part of the
standard. Unlike SBCCI or API, ASME would in some sense be surprised by the conversion of all
or part of one of its voluntary standards into a legal obligation. In the commercial use context for
which it was created, its copyright is entirely unexceptional, and its market initially depends on the
standard’s utility, not on compulsions that may have been created by its (perhaps surprising)
conversion into a legal obligation. On this assumption, there could have been no bargained price,
no prior contractual arrangement to develop the standard; and the price initially set for the standard

147

(...continued)
reflect the realities of the information age – including the questions now being raised about the copyright protection
available for standards that have been converted into law. “Content Strategy,” available at http://www.nfpa.org/itemdetail.asp?categoryid=2436&itemid=55491&url=about%20nfpa/content%20strategy (visited December 25, 2012).
(“We have had great success over the years using a business model in which the principal source of revenue was the sale
of print editions of our codes and standards. That business model is no longer sustainable.”) On September 12, 2012 it
announced that it was converting the terms of electronic sales of its standards into a “social” digital rights form making
purchased standards usable on all of a purchaser’s digital equipment; they will now be sold with an embedded watermark
identifying the purchaser. http://www.nfpa.org/newsReleaseDetails.asp?categoryid=488&itemId=58616&cookie_test=1
(Visited December 25, 2012).
148
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is likely market driven, not a function of any need to know the law governing one’s conduct. If
incorporation by reference served to lift the copyright and thus damage the market for the standard,
that unexpected conversion would appear to be a taking that – as with all governmental expropriations of private property – should be properly compensated. One might think, too, that requiring
the government to assess in advance the value of what it would be taking, rather than leaving that
value to be reaped from others on the subsequent market for knowledge of the law, had the potential
to control the most problematic characteristic of private standard-setting, the appearance that public
power has been placed in private hands. When agencies discover useful standards, rather than seek
their creation, this concern is subdued.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that a “takings” rationale would not take one so far as to
permit the prior owners to charge members of the public to know the law. When the government
takes private property for use as a public park there is a single payment for the property taken; not
a retained right to charge anyone who might subsequently want to use the park such admission fee
as the prior owner cared to set. The argument for this perspective on incorporated standards is the
stronger, considering that no one is compelled to use a park that the government has chosen to
create, whether by expropriation or not. Like the fees charged for obtaining those standards that
remain voluntary, park fees are controlled by the possibility of substitutions in the market. Substitutions are not possible for standards that have been converted into legal obligations. Moreover, if
incorporation by reference preserves copyright in what previously was just a voluntary standard, that
creates for the SDO an exclusive market for publication that might otherwise have been served by
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one of its competitors;149 this anti-competitive impact, not merely a private organization’s unusual
power to set monopoly prices for learning the law, further undercuts copyright-preserving alternatives.

The “takings” possibility, then, warrants some attention. The standard argument of the SDOs,
and a concern of government agencies, is that this would be unacceptably expensive for the agencies. In effect, the income stream from sale of incorporated standards is taken as a substitute for
direct payment of “just compensation.” It seems problematic, however, to transform the prospective
price for a taking (unmistakably a governmental obligation that may be judicially fixed if agreement
on it cannot be reached) into a price unilaterally set by monopolists on private parties with little
choice about purchase. Congress has in other contexts set its face against “unfunded mandates,”150
and that concern seems equally applicable here. Nor is it clear that agencies would in fact be
obliged to pay high prices for their use of SDO standards if a takings analysis were in place.

The agency can control if not entirely eliminate that value if it incorporates only those elements
of a standard that it finds regulation to require, and not the whole of the SDO’s work-product. As
already noted, voluntary consensus standards often go into much more detail that would be necessary, or even appropriate, to require by regulation. If an agency incorporates by reference only the
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definition of a “dent” from complex standards on tank truck safety,151 making that definition public
– the only publication that would be required – could hardly diminish the commercial value of the
standards as a whole. Whether or not conceptualized as fair use, such care to incorporate no more
of a set of standards than an agency’s needs entail might thus control the takings question. A
database to which access was free, but under digital rights management control, would meet the
statutory test of reasonable availability in the computer age, and seem likely to reinforce, not
undercut, the value of the full standard in print.

Moreover, the SDOs’ important and legitimate claims to finance their operations through sale
of their “voluntary consensus standards” are time-limited in a way that arguments for continuous
government protection of their intellectual property rights do not respect. ANSI’s Essential
Requirements include frequent reassessment of any voluntary consensus standards it accredits – in
general, no less frequently than every five years.152 Since it will take some time for an accredited
voluntary standard to be transformed into a legal obligation, one can have some confidence that the
price initially asked for the standard will be a market price. It is a voluntary standard; there are at
best market compulsions to purchase it. Since it takes time to incorporate it by reference, when that
happens only two or three years may be left before it is replaced as a voluntary consensus standard
by a revised version. That revised version is now the voluntary consensus standard, and that is the
standard whose price will in some sense be dictated by the market for such standards. Any claim
of right to compensation for the loss of sales of superannuated standards that an SDO has in fact
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changed on its own books seems outside a business model premised on sales of voluntary standards.
Independent of its conversion into law by incorporation, a standard’s commercial value will have
been eliminated, or at the very least greatly reduced, by its revision. Any price an SDO might be
able to charge for access to that displaced standard would owe its value just to the standard’s
transformation into law and not to its copyright as such.153 And the great majority of standards that
remain legal requirements today is more than fifteen years old.154

One of the ways, then, that SDOs might protect their appropriate business model – that is, their
reliance on sales into the market for voluntary consensus standards – would be simply to abandon
claims that superannuated standards may not be made public. If the claim for the right to sell access
to the standard were limited to the period between its adoption as a voluntary consensus standard
and its revision, one could have some confidence that the price charged would be that for a standard,
and not for law. One would not encounter situations like that presented by the American Herbal
Products Association, selling the contemporary version of its standards as a copyable and transferable physical book for 40% of the price it charges for the older, but incorporated, standards that is
sells under tightly restrictive digital rights management.155 Correspondingly, whatever an agency’s
reluctance might be to place in its electronic reading room the text of a contemporary standard it had
recently incorporated by reference, it could with confidence place that text there once the voluntary
standard, but not yet its own regulation, had been revised.
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D. Must Incorporation by Reference Create Legal Obligations?

Part 51, the OFR regulations on incorporation by reference, currently insists that incorporation
is proper only if it entails a legal obligation and, doubtless for this reason, goes on to provide that
future revisions of the incorporated standard cannot be referred to.156 This restriction, which has not
always been an element of OFR’s administration of 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1),157 bears much of the
responsibility for the failure of incorporated standards to keep up with voluntary consensus standards. Rulemaking requires resources that agencies have in short supply; changing an incorporated
standard is expensive. But the OFR position is not required by the APA’s text, and runs contrary
to the expectation under the NTTAA that standards will be “technical” and not “regulatory standards or requirements.”158 One readily imagines rules that directly state regulatory requirements and
invoke standards as illustrative but not required means of compliance, permitting agencies to use
guidance documents at lower procedural cost, and without creating law, to identify alternative
means of compliance as standards evolve. Such an approach would appear to be better both for
SDOs – their copyrights are not threatened when their standards are not converted into legal
obligations – and for agencies acquiring flexibility for change.
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Consider, in this regard, 29 C.F.R. 1926.200)(c), an element of OSHA’s safety and health
regulations for construction:159

(c) Caution signs. (1) Caution signs (see Figure G-2) shall be used only to warn
against potential hazards or to caution against unsafe practices.

(2) Caution signs shall have yellow as the predominating color; black upper panel
and borders: yellow lettering of “caution” on the black panel; and the lower yellow
panel for additional sign wording. Black lettering shall be used for additional wording.

(3) Standard color of the background shall be yellow; and the panel, black with
yellow letters. Any letters used against the yellow background shall be black. The
colors shall be those of opaque glossy samples as specified in Table 1 of American
National Standard Z53.1-1967.160

This regulation states a mandatory standard, putting a caution sign using some other colors than
those of “opaque glossy samples as specified in Table 1 of American National Standard Z53.11967" in violation, however minor, and exposing the company posting it to sanctions, however
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slight. Adopted in 1967, Standard Z53.1-1967 is now defunct, having apparently been displaced by
ANSI standard Z535 SET; it cannot be found in ANSI’s electronic library of standards. Yet,
because it remains under copyright, one would have to pay ANSI to obtain access to it, if it could
be found in print form. And if OSHA wished to bring its regulation up to date, incorporating ANSI
standard Z535 SET, it would have to go to the trouble (and expense) of convening notice-andcomment rulemaking proceedings to do so.161 As an alternative, imagine a regulation taking this
form:

(c) Caution signs. (1) Caution signs (see Figure G-2) shall be used only to warn
against potential hazards or to caution against unsafe practices.

(2) Caution signs shall have yellow as the predominating color; black upper panel
and borders: yellow lettering of “caution” on the black panel; and the lower yellow
panel for additional sign wording. Black lettering shall be used for additional wording.

(3) Standard color of the background shall be opaque glossy yellow; and the panel,
opaque glossy black with opaque glossy yellow letters. Any letters used against the
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yellow background shall be opaque glossy black.

(4) Compliance with this regulation may be assured by the use of opaque glossy
yellow and opaque glossy black colors as defined by ANSI standard Z535 SET, or
such other standards as may be listed from time to time as “compliance standards”
in OSHA’s electronic reading room.

Subsection (4) identifies one safe harbor and permits OSHA readily to identify others; because it
does not convert ANSI standard Z535 SET into a legal obligation, it does not threaten ANSI’s
copyright. Indeed, writing the regulation in this way would, quite desirably, preserve possible
competition among SDOs, protect SDO copyright revenues (subject to market competition in
standards), and avoid any need for further rulemaking. OSHA’s list would constitute a form of
guidance; and by itself making the listing determination, any issue of delegation of law-making into
private hands would be avoided.

Indeed, the distinction between legal requirements and standards identifying means of compliance characterizes other systems that have faced these issues. The British Standards Institute, for
example, presents the 27,000 standards it offers for sale on its website as “designed for voluntary
use and do not impose any regulations, by law.”162 In comments to the OMB Federal Register
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notice163 it associated this approach with one generally followed in Europe, strongly supporting a
distinction between “mandatory Regulations and the voluntary standards that provide a useful but
non-exclusive, means of compliance with them ... essential requirements and voluntary means of
compliance.”164 The use of standards as law is simply refused and privately developed standards are
instead identified as means for compliance with separately stated regulatory obligations. European
courts regularly refuse the status of law to standards generated by private organizations, as inconsistent with democratic principles. The “New Approach” of the European Union uses law (Directives)
to establish the essential requirements that European products must meet to be marketable in its
single market; one can then demonstrate compliance with those requirements independently, or by
showing the satisfaction of standards developed by European or national standards organizations to
identify complying products. And the adequacy of those standards to meet the “essential requirements” is itself open to question. They are not, in themselves, legally binding, but rather have a
force similar to that of “guidance” in American administrative practice. In such a context, the issue
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of copyrighting “law” does not arise. One may be certain that most if not all persons faced with the
need to comply with essential requirements will choose the “standards” route to satisfaction; yet as
they are not compelled to do so, they are free to compare the price of that route with such alternatives as may be available to them.

A recent book, Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli’s The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of
Regulation in the World Economy,165 explores contrasts between American and international
standards practices in considerable detail. In a global economy, technical standards that differ
across countries can become substantial trade barriers – the proposition that lies behind the World
Trade Organization’s continuing concern with non-tariff barriers to trade.166 Where in the United
States standards development organizations are many – potential competitors, with only some of
them under the relatively loose supervisory aegis of the American National Standards Institute167 –
standards organizations in other economies are typically national or, like CEN or ISO, multinational.
The British Standards Institute’s tight hierarchical control over the work done by subordinate
groups, CEN’s ability to set single standards for the European market, both assure national (or
international) uniformity and (given its resulting political significance) result in more balanced
representation in its deliberations168 than ANSI can assure across the hundreds of competing
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American standards developing organizations, many of which are not within its aegis or choose on
occasion not to submit their standards to its certification.169

American standards organizations repeatedly assert the superiority of the competitive, loosely
organized American system, yet what it gains domestically it may lose in the international context
Büthe and Mattli seem able to demonstrate that with the growth of Europe as a single market, the
its tightly coordinated standards have often prevailed. National standards organizations speak in
CEN or ISO with an authority that ANSI cannot command. And the result, they assert, is to disadvantage domestic American market participants. American multi-nationals may learn about and be
in a position to influence these standards, but wholly American firms will not170 – another way in
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which standards processes may serve to favor the largest market participants. Thus, they report, a
1988 EU directive on the safety of toys led to development of standards by CEN which were then
accepted verbatim as ISO standards, producing “not only a de facto requirement for exporting to the
European market, but also for exporting to many other international markets.”171 American
manufacturers lacking European subsidiaries learned about the process too late to participate in ISO
consensus procedures – many, not until after the ISO vote – resulting in lost market share and/or a
costly need to retool. In contrast, American firms seeking in the early 2000s to establish an
ANSI/ASME standard for the optics industry as an ISO standard failed almost completely.
“European manufacturers quickly learned of this proposal and realized that the changes would
impose on them costs estimated at several billion euros for German industry alone”; their efforts in
response resulted in an ISO standard “much closer to European preferences.” In 2009, ASME
withdrew its competing standard and “U.S. optics industry organizations started to adopt the ISO
standard instead.”

One might note that, to the extent the existence of competing standards and standards development organizations is an asset of the American system, any incorporation by reference that carries
the force of law undermines it. If each of three competing voluntary consensus standards may
satisfy a given regulatory need, market forces will tend to control price even if we assume consum170
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ers will feel driven to purchase one or another of the three. If one of the competing standards
developers is able to secure the incorporation of its standard as law, the result is not only both (1)
to confer monopoly pricing power on that developer (if it is permitted to charge the public for access
to it) and (2) to have the tendency to freeze the standard in place, given the obstacles to rulemaking
change, but (3) it also is anti-competitive behavior vis a vis the other two SDOs.172 An SDO’s
ability to continue to charge a premium price for an incorporated standard even after it has been
superceded as a voluntary consensus standard (but before the governing law has been changed) is
much harder to rationalize in terms of an appropriate SDO business model, than its ability to charge
market prices for access to its voluntary consensus standards during their useful life as contemporaneous expressions of useful technical measures.173 One perhaps understands SDO enthusiasm for
converting their standards into law in these terms – so long as their ability to charge the public for
learning them remains – but that makes the government’s continued complicity in the process the
more striking.

V. CHANGING PART 51

Although the ACUS recommendation addressed only the practices of agencies using incorpration by reference in rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1) places responsibility for the regulation of
incorporation by reference practice in the hands of the Director of the Office of the Federal Register.
He may permit incorporation by reference of material otherwise required to be published in the
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Federal Register only on determining that it will be “reasonably available” to those affected by it –
a concept initially grounded in the expectation that commercial publishing houses would be
including incorporated materials in their widely distributed, market-priced collections.174 As
outlined earlier, Part 51 of OFR’s regulations, unamended since 1982, establish the framework for
these judgments, and they are remarkably deficient. Unadapted to the computer age, they imagine
that only print copies need be available and, as administered, availability in public sources need be
in two places only – the National Archives and the adopting agency’s own central library.175 Beyond
that, the regulations lack attention to continued availability, as they also lack attention to the price
that copyright holders may ask for access to them from their hands. Part 51 requires that for
regulations to be incorporated, they must impose legal obligations, and only one identified version
of the standard may be incorporated – effectively requiring new rulemaking should the agency wish
to follow SDO revisions over time. Despite the impulses of the NTTAA and Circular A-119 to
limit incorporations to “technical standards” and not “regulatory standards or requirements,” any
voluntary consensus standard may incorporated; nor is there apparent concern whether to access the
incorporated material a consumer may obtain only the matter incorporated from the adopting SDO,
or rather must purchase the whole of the standard as the SDO may have packaged it.

The same reduction of governmental resources for regulation as has contributed to agencies’
increasing reliance on privately generated standards (and reduced their capacity to monitor their
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creation) may help to explain if not excuse these deficiencies. When Part 51 was adopted in 1982,
the legal affairs staff working on IBR (along with many other legal issues for the Federal Register)
was three or four times the size (three) it is today.176 Yet computer-age-oriented changes in the
Federal Register and in another of the National Archives’ activities have won both of the annual
awards for innovation in government services that the Administrative Conference has conferred to
date;177 accommodating “incorporation by reference” to the resources of the computer age seems an
obvious further step, made the more imperative by the requirements of E-Government and EFOIA.178

Creation of a digital archive of incorporated standards to replace (or supplement) the current
physical archive, under digital rights management to the extent that might be necessary, would
satisfy the self-evident minimum standard of reasonable availability in the computer age. It would
assure a persisting resource for standards that can remain law long after they have been replaced in
the compendia of the SDOs that have created them.179 (Of course individual agencies, or even
ANSI, could provide such a resource, although having this in the same electronic place as the Code
of Federal Regulations, with consequent ease of linkage, would be desirable.) It can be adminis-
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tered to lift any digital rights management regime that might be in place while the incorporated
matter remains the active voluntary consensus standard of the SDO that created it, once that
standard has been revised, so that the law “on the books” is no longer the contemporary voluntary
consensus standard.

Other changes could significantly shrink the area of conflict between SDO copyright interests
and the proposition that law is not subject to copyright. One at least would require little if any
administration by OFR – to permit, even express a preference for, incorporations that invoke the
European model, independently stating regulatory requirements and then identifying a voluntary
consensus standard as one (but not necessarily the only) means by which those requirements can be
met. Since agency rulemaking would not then be required to identify additional standards meeting
those requirements, the modernity and flexibility of rules would be enhanced, and the need for
rulemakings calling on OFR for judgment reduced. Requiring agency submissions to indicate steps
taken during the comment period – how the proposed standard was made accessible to commenters,
what materials from the responsible SDO had been placed in the FDMS – is called for by contemporary rulemaking doctrine that will be of greatest interest to the rulemaking agency; its recognition
in Part 51 need require little administrative attention by OFR but would reinforce sound agency
practice.

Largely self-enforcing, but arguably requiring some administrative attention from OFR, would
be other measures to reduce if not eliminate the extent to which incorporations create “law” that
both might be of significant interest to actors outside the affected regulatory communities (which
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can often be expected to need to acquire access to consensus standards irrespective of their status
as law) and could interfere with essential SDO financial needs if made public. NTTAA and OMB
Circular A-119 have in view “technical standards,” not "regulatory standards or requirements."
Restoring Part 51's initial requirement that matters to be incorporated have that character would tend
to limit them in ways quite uninteresting to the general public – indeed, from that perspective,
placing the incorporated matter outside the idea of “law” that citizens must be able to access to
know their obligations. Second, agencies might be asked to demonstrate in their submissions for the
Director’s approval that they had limited the material incorporated to the minimum extent required
for their regulatory purposes – for example, incorporating only the definition of “dent” contained in
a much more extensive collection of voluntary consensus standards applicable to tank trucks.180
Doing so could permit inclusion of just that material in the electronic archive of incorporated
standards, a fair use, without significant threat to SDO financial interests.

To the extent incorporations by reference persist that do importantly take on the characteristics
of “law,” that are unmistakably "regulatory standards or requirements," it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that knowledge of them is the citizen’s right, and that monopoly pricing power over that
knowledge cannot properly be conferred by recognizing copyright in them after the fact of their
incorporation. Placing that information in an electronic archive under digital rights management
could succeed in preserving the responsible SDO’s principal markets for its standards while
accommodating that claim of right. That any financial consequences of being found to have taken
private property by converting it into public law would fall on the adopting agency should operate
180
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as an incentive for the agency to bargain in advance, should it know this is the outcome it wishes,
or to act in ways that maximally preserve SDO value when after the independent development of a
voluntary consensus standard it discovers its regulatory relevance. Part 51 can be reconstructed in
ways that reduce if not eliminate this field of conflict, and that is the effort OFR should undertake.
VI. CONCLUSION

John Cooney, the Washington lawyer who chaired the Committee responsible for the ACUS
recommendations, aptly described the central conflict that has animated this discussion as a
“wicked question.”181 The SDO community, valuable – essential – to effective regulation in the
Twenty-First Century, requires the income generated by the sales of its uncontroversially copyrighted voluntary consensus standards to continue its work. And yet once such a standard has
been converted into a legal obligation through its incorporation by reference, the proposition that
law is not subject to copyright rears its head. If this conflict is not readily resolved, can it be
eased? Can the abuses and failures set out in the preceding pages be avoided?

The preceding discussion has identified a number of measures by which ANSI or individual
SDOs might improve their chances of preserving the income stream they receive from the sale of
their voluntary consensus standards that are subject to agency conversion into legal obligations:

C

Integrate with their standards explanatory materials or explanations that will not be incor-
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porated elements and will enhance the value of the standards in users’ hands;
C

Avoid conflict with established federal rulemaking norms by assuring would-be commenters some form of free access to standards proposed for incorporation by reference
during rulemaking notice and comment periods, and providing rulemaking agencies with
complete records of their standards development process;

C

Create an archive controlled by digital rights management techniques for access to standards once incorporated;

C

Work with agencies to limit incorporations by reference where possible to relevant parts,
and not the whole, of voluntary consensus standards, thus reducing the stakes in having
the incorporated portions made public and arguably heightening the value of the standards
as a whole;

C

Price standards as voluntary consensus standards, making any standard that incorporation
has converted into legal obligations freely available once the adoption of a revised voluntary consensus standard effectively converts any further sales of it into a sale of law;

C

Encourage agencies to follow the European model, using standards as accepted means of
compliance with regulation rather than as regulatory obligations per se.

Agencies, in turn, can take steps that minimize the threats to these valuable partners’ proper
claims to compensation for the public’s use of their work-product:

C

When an agency effectively initiates the process by seeking the development of a standard to be incorporated, take the contractual route of purchasing the desired standard for
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an agreed price rather than permitting its price to be passed along to the affected public;
C

Where at all possible, follow the European approach of stating regulatory requirements
directly, and identifying incorporated standards as assured but not required means for
complying therewith.

C

Restrict the use of incorporation by reference, as the NTTAA and OMB Circular A-119
anticipate, to technical standards, and not "regulatory standards or requirements";

C

Implement the ACUS recommendations to develop measures permitting limited access
during rulemaking comment periods;

C

Obtain, and incorporate in agency records during the rulemaking comment period, full
SDO and ANSI records of the development of the standard proposed to be incorporated,
including the resolution of any conflicts occurring at the time;

C

Incorporate by reference only those elements of a voluntary consensus standard essential
to its regulation, then made public if they create legal obligations;

C

Make incorporated standards public, as by posting them on agency websites, as soon as
their status as voluntary consensus standards has been ended by SDO revision of them;

Most important, however, are the steps that the Office of Federal Register should take in
revising and administering its regulations implementing 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1):

C

At the very least, the OFR must bring its regulations into the 21st Century and the Information Age, redefining what makes incorporated material “reasonably available” in light
of the possibilities of electronic storage, search, and access;
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C

It should require, as part of an agency showing that matter proposed to be incorporated is
“reasonably available,” that free access of some character was given to it during the comment period, and that records of the SDO and ANSI process were available to commenters, as on FDMS;

C

It should withdraw its current requirement that material incorporated by reference impose
legal obligations, and prefer rules that independently state regulatory obligations and then
identify the standard proposed for incorporation by reference as an assured but not necessary means of meeting those obligations, permitting flexible agency identification of
future complying standards.

C

It should refuse to permit incorporation by reference of standards that constitute "regulatory standards or requirements" rather than technical standards;

C

If a standard as incorporated will nonetheless impose a fixed legal obligation, it should
require that to be “reasonably available,” it, the SDO, or the responsible agency must
have in place some means (such as an archive under digital rights management) by which
knowledge of the obligation can be had without charge;

C

To assure that incorporated standards continue to be “reasonably available” as they age,
it should require an undertaking that the text of any incorporated standard will be posted
to the agency ’s electronic reading room as soon as its status as a voluntary consensus
standards has been ended by an SDO revision of it.

C

To supplement its archive of physical copies of incorporated standards, it should create a
readily searched electronic archive of all incorporated standards, protecting under digital
rights management only those standards that have not been replaced as voluntary consen-80-

sus standards by revised standards.
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